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THE HYDRAULIC PRESSURE OF VENGEANCE:' UNITED
STATES v. ALVAREZ-MACHAIN AND THE CASE FOR A
JUSTIFIABLE ABDUCTION
INTRODUCTION
On April 2, 1990, five or six men burst into the office of a Mexi-
can gynecologist, Dr. Humberto Alvarez-Machain. The men, paid
agents of the United States Drug Enforcement Agency ("DEA"), 3
seized the doctor, drove him to an airport in Northern Mexico, and
placed him on a plane bound for El Paso, Texas, and the waiting
arms of the DEA.4 Dr. Alvarez-Machain was under indictment in
the United States in connection with his alleged role'in the brutal
abduction, torture, and subsequent murder of Enrique "Kiki"
Camarena-Salazar, a DEA agent working in Mexico.5 Dr. Alvarez-
Machain, the United States alleged, had been present during
Camarena's torture, and had medically prolonged his life so that he
would live long enough to answer the questions of his interrogators.'
In United States v. Alvarez-Machain 7 the United States Su-
preme Court held that Dr. Alvarez-Machain, a Mexican citizen,
could stand trial in the United States for violations of U.S. domestic
law, even though agents of the United States had kidnapped the
1. The title is taken from Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes's statement in Northern Securities
Co. v. United States, 197 U.S. 193 (1908), cited in United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct.
2188, 2205 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Holmes wrote:
Great cases like hard cases make bad law. For great cases are called great, not by
reason of their real importance in shaping the law of the future, but because of some
accident of immediate overwhelming interest which appeals to the feelings and
distorts the judgment. These immediate interests exercise a kind of hydraulic pressure
which makes what previously was clear seem doubtful, and before which even well
settled principles of law will bend.
Northern Securities, 197 U.S. at 400-01 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
2. United States v. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. 599, 603 (C.D. Cal. 1990), affid sub nom.
United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 946 F.2d 1466 (9th Cir. 1991) (per curiam), revd, 112 S. Ct.
2188 (1992).
3. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. at 603.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 602.
6. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2190.
7. 112 S. Ct. 2188 (1992).
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defendant in Mexico.' The Court further held that his abduction did
not violate the extradition treaty between the United States and
Mexico.'
This decision reaffirmed the long-standing judicial policy of non-
inquiry into the means used to bring a criminal suspect to justice.10
The decision also provoked strong criticism from the international
community and from opponents of extraterritorial abduction.11 In
Congress, Representative Leon Panetta of California introduced leg-
islation specifically aimed at reversing the effect of Alvarez-
Machain.12 In the Senate, the response took the form of an amend-
8. Id. at 2197.
9. Id.; see infra notes 394-26 and accompanying text (discussing the majority opinion in
United States v. Alvarez-Machain).
10. See infra notes 145-261 and accompanying text (discussing the different methods of ob-
taining custody).
11. See, e.g., Michael J. Glennon, State-Sponsored Abduction: A Comment on United States v.
Alvarez-Machain, 86 AM. J. INT'L. L. 746 (1992) (criticizing the Alvarez-Machain decision for
applying an antiquated doctrine and ignoring the issue of Presidential authority to displace inter-
national law); Stephen Bindman, Ottawa Lodges Protests of U.S. Kidnapping Fugitive, GAZETTE
(Montreal), Feb. 17, 1992, at E7 (noting the Canadian government's filing of an amicus curiae
brief in Alvarez-Machain); Foreign Minister Says Machain Ruling "Insulted" Mexican Sover-
eignty, NOTIMEX MEXICAN NEWS SERVICE, June 29, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
INTL file (quoting Mexican foreign minister Fernando Solana Morales and noting, however, that
the Bush administration had been "flexible in its response to Mexico's concerns about the implica-
tions of the Machain ruling, and ha[d] shown 'a good spirit of reconciliation' "); Sen. Daniel P.
Moynihan, Supreme Court's Kidnapping Ruling is Manifestly Wrong, ROLL CALL, UPI, July 27,
1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI file (criticizing the decision as contrary to interna-
tional law and noting a pattern of U.S. disregard for international law); OAS Opinion Asked In
U.S. Abduction Decision, UPI, June 27, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI file (not-
ing that the presidents of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay requested that
the Organization of American States's Interamerican Judicial Committee issue an opinion on the
U.S. decision); Reaction to U.S. Supreme Court Decision Endorsing Right to Kidnap Foreigners
for Prosecution in U.S., NoTISUR, June 30, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, INTL file
(noting the negative reactions of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Peru, Uru-
guay, and Venezuela); U.S. "Right to Abduct" Rejected by Angry CARICOM Leaders, LATIN
AM. REGIONAL REP.: CARIBBEAN, July 23, 1992, at 8 (quoting St. Lucia Senator Mary Francis as
saying "[the U.S.] is going crazy"); Washington Reassures Columbia Over Kidnappings,
REUTERS NEWS SERVICE, June 17,1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, INTL file (describ-
ing U.S. diplomatic efforts to reassure the Columbian government that the United States respects
Columbian sovereignty). But see Malvina Halberstam, In Defense of the Supreme Court Decision
in Alvarez-Machain, 86 AM. J. INT'L. L. 736 (1992) (arguing that the Court's decision was consis-
tent with current international practice and an affirmation of the Executive's role in foreign af-
fairs); Bruce Fein, Victory for the Rule of Law, WASH. TIMES, June 23, 1992, at F1 (arguing that
if international law forbids kidnapping fugitives, then "something is wrong with international law,
not the abductions").
12. International Kidnapping and Extradition Treaty Enforcement Act of 1992, H.R. 5565,
102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992). This act provides:
(a) A person who is forcibly abducted from a foreign place which has in effect an
extradition treaty with the United States-
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ment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 that was sponsored by
Senators Daniel Moynihan, Paul Simon, and Claiborne Pell. 13
On December 14, 1992, United States District Court Judge Ed-
ward Rafeedie dismissed the charges against Dr. Alvarez-Machain
for lack of sufficient evidence. Two days later, Dr. Alvarez-Machain
returned to Mexico after nearly three years of incarceration in the
United States. 4
To prosecute a foreign criminal suspect in the United States, a
court must first establish sufficient jurisdiction over both the offense
and the offender.15 This jurisdictional nexus, however, is meaning-
less in practical terms unless the court has physical custody of the
criminal suspect.' 6 In an international context, physical custody con-
templates either a cooperative venture between nations or the unilat-
eral act of one nation to bring the suspect before the appropriate
judicial forum.' 7
This Note explores the traditional bases of jurisdiction over extra-
territorial criminal acts in United States law as a starting point for
a discussion of the propriety of prosecuting international criminal
suspects. 8 The Note then discusses the limitations on a nation's
power to exercise its jurisdiction abroad, including the requirements
(1) by the agents of a governmental authority in the United States for the purposes
of a criminal prosecution; and
(2) in violation of the norms of international law;
shall not be subject to prosecution by any governmental authority in the United
States.
(b) An abduction is not, for the purposes of this section, a violation of the norms of
international law if the government of the foreign place consents to that abduction,
but such consent may not be implied by the absence of a prohibition on such abduc-
tions in a treaty regarding extradition.
Id. § 2(a), (b); see also 138 CONG. REC. 6019 (1992) (statement of Rep. Panetta) (explicitly
criticizing the Alvarez-Machain decision as an "outrage").
13. Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 Amendment, S. 3250, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992). This
amendment specifically forbids the United States from participating, either directly or indirectly,
in international abductions without the express consent of the state. Id. § 2(l)(B). Unlike the
House version, the Senate bill does not limit the proscription to nations with which the United
States has an extradition treaty. Id. Like the House version, the Senate action denied
prosecutorial authority over abducted persons. Id. § 4.
14. George de Lama, Abducted Mexican Cleared in Killing, CHI. TRIB.. Dec. 15, 1992, §1, at
1.
15. See infra notes 26-144 and accompanying text (discussing jurisdictional theories under in-
ternational law).
16. See infra notes 145-261 and accompanying text (discussing the methods for and problems
with obtaining custody of criminal suspects abroad).
17. See infra notes 145-261 and accompanying text (discussing methods for obtaining custody
of foreign criminal suspects).
18. See infra notes 26-144 and accompanying text (discussing jurisdictional theories).
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for extradition by treaty and the duty of nations to prosecute or
extradite fugitives from other countries' judicial processes. 19
The Note then analyzes the United States's methods of acquiring
physical custody over fugitives whose presence the United States is
either unwilling or unable to secure through extradition.20 The
United States's willingness to abduct foreign suspects without resort
to extradition, often accomplished by entering into informal ar-
rangements between law enforcement officers to accomplish the
same goals of extradition, reflects the evolution of the U.S. policy
during the 1980s. This policy made a 180-degree turn between 1980
and 1989, going from one in which law enforcement efforts overseas
depended on the cooperation of the host nation to one embodied by
the so-called "Barr memorandum," an official opinion concluding
that the United States has the unilateral authority to enforce United
States law extraterritorially. 2'
This shift in U.S. policy reflects law enforcement'officers' intense
frustration with the perceived inability or unwillingness of foreign
countries to cooperate in bringing about effective resolutions to
criminal investigations. Nowhere is that frustration, nor law en-
forcement's willingness to ride the edge of legality, more apparent
than the intensive investigation that resulted from the abduction,
torture, and murder of United States DEA agent Enrique
Camarena-Salazar. That investigation led to the extraordinary ap-
prehension of three foreign suspects, including Dr. Alvarez-
Machain.22
The Note then addresses the Alvarez-Machain 2  decision and
analyzes the majority and dissenting opinions. It concludes that
while the Court was correct in deciding that it had jurisdiction to
try Dr. Alvarez-Machain, it was incorrect in deciding that the ab-
duction was consistent with the terms of the U.S.-Mexico extradi-
tion treaty. Further, the Court's opinion neither accurately reflects
the purposes of general extradition practices nor the purposes specif-
19. See infra notes 173-88, 507-16 and accompanying text (discussing the state's duty to prose-
cute or extradite a fugitive).
20. See infra notes 189-261 and accompanying text (discussing alternate methods of acquiring
custody of fugitives outside of the extradition process).
21. See infra notes 262-97 and accompanying text (discussing the evolution of U.S. policy in
international abductions).
22. See infra notes 298-369 and accompanying text (discussing the Camarena investigation).
23. 112 S. Ct. 2188 (1992); see infra notes 394-462 and accompanying text (discussing the
majority and dissenting opinions decision in this case).
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ically expressed in the U.S.-Mexico extradition treaty.24
This Note then offers a framework for "justifiable" extraterrito-
rial abductions based on objective criteria.25 Applying this analysis,
the Note concludes that while the United States clearly had valid
jurisdictional premises under which to prosecute Dr. Alvarez-
Machain, and that the Mexican government arguably failed in its
duty to either prosecute him or deliver him to the United States
under bilateral and multilateral agreements, the United States
failed to exhaust all other means of obtaining jurisdiction over the
defendant and was not justified in abducting him.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Traditional Bases of Jurisdiction in International Law
To prosecute a foreign criminal, a United States court is required
to have valid jurisdiction over the offense and the offender. Jurisdic-
tion in international law may be defined as a state's26 authority to
affect its legal interests.27 Functionally, jurisdiction consists of a
state's power: to prescribe - the ability to make its laws applicable
to the person or entity; to adjudicate - the power to subject persons
or things to its legal process; and to enforce - the authority to com-
pel compliance or to punish disobedience to its laws.28 Since a state
may not enforce a law that it has no authority to make,29 the power
of a state to prescribe rules of law is logically dispositive in extrater-
ritorial criminal prosecutions; the state must first establish jurisdic-
tion over the criminal defendant based on a valid exercise of its
power to make laws.
24. See infra notes 463-543 and accompanying text (analyzing the Alvarez-Machain decision.).
25. See infra notes 490-527 and accompanying text (articulating and applying the "justifiable"
abduction model).
26. See 1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 201 (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)] ("[A] state is an entity that has a defined
territory and a permanent population, under the control of its own government and that engages
in, or has the capacity to engage in, formal relations with other such entities."); Harvard Re-
search in International Law, Jurisdiction With Respect to Crime, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. 435, 466 art.
l(a) (Supp. 1935) [hereinafter Harvard Research] ("A 'state' is a member of the community of
nations.").
27. Christopher L. Blakesley, Jurisdictional Issues and Conflicts of Jurisdiction, in LEGAL RE-
SPONSES TO INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 131, 137 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1987).
28. 1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 26, § 401.
29. Id. § 431 cmt. a ("[A] state may not exercise authority to enforce law that it has no
jurisdiction to prescribe.").
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International law recognizes five bases 30 for exercising prescrip-
tive jurisdiction: territorial jurisdiction,3' nationality jurisdiction, 2
protective jurisdiction," passive personality jurisdiction, 4 and uni-
versal jurisdiction. 5
1. Territorial Jurisdiction
Territorial jurisdiction 6 is the precept under which a state
prescribes and enforces laws within its own physical boundaries.37
Territorial jurisdiction is the primary basis for asserting jurisdiction
in virtually all states.3 All nations recognize that states have broad,
though not unlimited,3 9 authority to regulate the conduct of people
and entities within their physical boundaries.40 This state power to
regulate conduct within its boundaries is inherent in a state's sover-
eignty.4' As Chief Justice John Marshall noted:
The jurisdiction of courts is a branch of that which is possessed by the na-
30. A sixth principle, ubiquity, is recognized in European law. Christopher L. Blakesley & Otto
Lagodny, Finding Harmony Amidst Disagreement Over Extradition, Jurisdiction, The Role of
Human Rights, and Issues of Extraterritoriality Under International Criminal Law. 24 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 15 (1991). Ubiquity, as a jurisdictional tenet, provides that a crime is deemed
to have occurred in either the place that the perpetrator acted or in the place where the proscribed
harm occurred. Id. While some European commentators assert that ubiquity has no parallel in
U.S. law, Professors Blakesley and Lagodny argue that, while the parallel suffers from an ad hoc
development, it nonetheless exists in a combination of the objective and subjective territoriality
theories of jurisdictional competence. Id.; see also infra notes 36-57 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing territorial jurisdiction).
31. 1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 26, § 402(c).
32. Id. para. (e).
33. Id. para. (f).
34. Id. para. (g).
35. Id. § 404.
36. While some treaties and scholars use "jurisdiction" and "territory" interchangeably, they
represent two distinct concepts. Jurisdiction is a legal theory by which a state justifies its assertion
of the right to prescribe and enforce rules of law; "territory" is the physical scope of the prescrip-
tive and enforcement power. I M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION: UNITED
STATES LAW AND PRACTICE 255 (2d ed. rev. 1987) [hereinafter BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL
EXTRADITION].
37. Id. at 251.
38. Blakesley & Lagodny, supra note 30, at 9.
39. Limitations on a state's prescriptive authority within its territory include self-imposed limi-
tations on governmental action, such as constitutional or legislative restrictions, as well as limita-
tions imposed by international law. I BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION, supra note 36, at
254.
40. A state's jurisdictional competence over crimes that begin in that state but are consum-
mated elsewhere is referred to as the subjective application of territorial jurisdiction. IAN BROWN-
LIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 300-01 (4th ed. 1990).
41. 1 BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION, supra note 36, at 252.
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tion as an independent sovereign power.
The jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is necessarily exclu-
sive and absolute. It is susceptible of no limitation not imposed by itself.
Any restriction upon it, deriving validity from an external source, would im-
ply a diminution of its sovereignty to the extent of the restriction, and an
investment of that sovereignty to the same extent in that power which could
impose such restriction. 2
Thus, when a crime or other offense is purely domestic in charac-
ter, the authority of the state to prescribe and enforce its laws is not
in question. That a state's sovereignty confers nearly absolute au-
thority to prescribe and enforce laws within its own territory has a
logical corollary: A state may not exercise its jurisdiction outside its
territory without the acquiescence of the affected state. 3 When an
offense involves one or more foreign components, the state's author-
ity to punish rests, to a greater or lesser extent, on the relationships
between legal systems and on international law." Early American
decisions in this regard were couched in absolute terms. For exam-
ple, in The Apollon," the court held that the United States could
not exercise jurisdiction over a French ship in the interstitial zone
between the U.S. (Georgia) and Spanish (Florida) territories. The
ship had purposely docked at the Spanish port to avoid an excise on
French ships in American ports, and American officials seized the
ship and its contents." The court held that "[t]he laws of no nation
can justly extend beyond its own territories, except so far as regards
its own citizens. They can have no force to control the sovereignty or
rights of any other nation, within its own jurisdiction. ' 7
42. Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812).
43. See The S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (Ser. A) No. 10, at 23, 25 (Sept. 7). The
court stated:
Now the first and foremost restriction imposed by international law upon a State is
that - failing the existence of a permissive rule to the contrary - it may not exer-
cise its power in any form in the territory of another State. In this sense jurisdiction is
certainly territorial; it cannot be exercised by a State outside its territory except by
virtue of a permissive rule derived from international custom or from a convention.
Id. For an example of a convention or treaty permitting one state to exercise its jurisdiction within
the territory of another state, see North Atlantic Treaty Organization Status of Forces, June 19,
1951, art. 7, 4 U.S.T. 1792, 1798, 199 U.N.T.S. 67, 76 (providing that members states sending
and receiving military forces, civilian employees, and their dependents between signatory states
would assist one another in the arrest of criminal suspects for rendition to the proper authorities,
whether they be the host nation or sending nation).
44. Kenneth C. Randall, Universal Jurisdiction Under International Law, 66 TEXAS L. REV.
785, 786 (1988).
45. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 361 (1824).
46. Id. at 363.
47. Id. at 370.
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Issues of territorial jurisdiction in international law often turn on
whether a state possesses prescriptive and enforcement authority
over a given territory at a given time.4 8 For example, in In re Lo
Dolce49 the defendant admitted robbing and murdering his com-
manding officer while in combat behind enemy lines in Italy during
World War 11.50 The United States could no longer prosecute the
defendant for the murder under the Uniform Code of Military Jus-
tice because he had since left the military." Similarly, the United
States could not try the defendant in the United States for a crime
committed overseas. The Italian government requested extradition,
but the district court held that Italy did not have jurisdiction over
the crime since Germany had been in control of the territory when
the crime had occurred. 2
Territorial jurisdiction, however, is not limited to crimes that take
place wholly within the territory controlled by a given state.5 3
United States courts have sustained jurisdiction over criminal acts
that took place, in whole or in part, outside its physical boundaries
but where the effect of the crimes occurred in the United States. 4
Scholars refer to this extension of the principle of territorial juris-
diction as "objective territoriality," 55 or the "effects principle. ' 5
48. I BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION, supra note 36, at 254.
49. 106 F. Supp. 455 (W.D.N.Y. 1952); see also United States v. Icardi, 140 F. Supp. 383
(D.D.C. 1956) (alleging that lcardi, LoDolce's superior officer, and LoDolce had flipped a coin to
determine which of them would murder the commander); I BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADI-
TION. supra note 36, at 256 (explaining that Lo Dolce is an example of this issue).
50. In re Lo Dolce, 106 F. Supp. at 456.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 460-61; see I BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION, supra note 36, at 256 (argu-
ing that had the Germans attempted to extradite Lo Dolce, they would have also failed since
Germany would not have had present jurisdiction to enforce laws that were in effect at the time
the crime occurred).
53. 1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 26, § 402.
54. See, e.g., United States v. Cotten, 471 F.2d 744 (9th Cir. 1973) (upholding the jurisdic-
tional scope of a statute prohibiting the theft of government property even though the crimes were
committed against U.S. military sales facilities in Viet Nam and Japan); Rivard v. United States,
375 F.2d 882 (5th Cir. 1967) (upholding U.S. territorial jurisdiction over a conspiracy directed
entirely from outside the United States).
55. 1 BASSIOUNI. INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION, supra note 36, at 261; BROWNLIE, supra note
40, at 301.
56. 1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 26, § 402 cmt. d (referring to the "effects principle"
as an aspect of territoriality implicated when a state exercises its power to prescribe or enforce
laws respecting conduct that takes place outside its borders but affects in the state asserting juris-
diction); see also Rivard, 375 F.2d at 882-83. In Rivard, the defendant was convicted of both
conspiracy to import heroin and actually importing heroin into the United States, even though he
had never entered the country. Id. The court held that it had jurisdiction to try Rivard on both the
conspiracy and the substantive counts, reasoning that a sovereign's jurisdiction "extends over all
[Vol. 43:449
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Justice Holmes gave voice to this rule of objective territoriality
when he said: "Acts done outside a jurisdiction, but intended to pro-
duce and producing detrimental effects within it, justify a State in
punishing the cause of the harm as if he had been present at the
effect, if the State should succeed in getting him within its power.'' 5
2. Nationality Jurisdiction
A second principle of international jurisdiction - the nationality
theory58 - bases jurisdiction on the nationality or allegiance of the
defendant, regardless of where the offense takes place.59 The ration-
ale for this assertion of state authority is that a sovereign's national
enjoys the protection of its laws even while abroad, and thus has a
corresponding duty to obey national laws that have an extraterrito-
rial effect.60 The dispositive factor is not necessarily citizenship;
rather, allegiance, domicile, or residence may also implicate nation-
ality jurisdiction."1 Thus, in Joyce v. Director of Public Prosecu-
tions,62 an English court tried and hanged Joyce, an American na-
tional who had at some point obtained a false British passport, for
making treasonous radio broadcasts from Germany during World
War 11.63 The court reasoned that he had enjoyed the privileges of
British citizenship and had therefore incurred its commensurate ob-
ligations under British law."'
States differ in their application of nationality-based jurisdiction.
In U.S. practice,' the types of offenses subject to nationality-based
jurisdiction are limited. 5 Further, territorial jurisdiction and the
acts which take effect within the sovereign even though the author is elsewhere." Id. at 886.
57. Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280, 285 (1911).
58. 1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 26, § 402(2). This principle is sometimes referred to
as the "active personality" principle. I BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION, supra note 36,
at 288.
59. Blakesley, supra note 27, at 139.
60. 1 BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION, supra note 36, at 288; see, e.g., Chandler v.
United States, 171 F.2d 921 (1st Cir. 1948) (holding that the treason statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2381
(1946), applied extraterritorially to United States citizens).
61. 1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 26, § 402 cmt. e; BROWNLIE, supra note 40, at 303.
62. [1946] I All E.R. 186 (H.L.).
63. Id. at 187.
64. Id. at 192-93.
65. Compare I RESTATEMENT (THIRD). supra note 26, § 402(3) cmt. f & reporter's note I
("Apart from its tax law . . . the United States has only sparingly applied law to individuals
residing abroad on the basis of their United States nationality.") with Harvard Research, supra
note 26, at 523 (analyzing United States legislative enactments that adhered to the nationality
theory and categorizing them based on the types of conduct proscribed).
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possibility of dual citizenship, coupled with nationality-based juris-
diction, may create parallel jurisdiction between states and the pos-
sibility of double jeopardy. 6
The theories of jurisdiction discussed above depend on a nexus
either between the criminal act and the prosecuting state's territory
or between the actor and the prosecuting state. A third principle of
international jurisdiction provides jurisdiction over acts that have no
direct impact within the prosecuting state and are committed by a
foreign actor. Protective jurisdiction is premised on a state's legiti-
mate concern with protecting its vital interests worldwide.
3. Protective Jurisdiction
Protective jurisdiction 7 is, in effect, a "long-arm" jurisdictional
theory that allows a state to apply its laws to non-national criminal
defendants where the criminal act affects a vital state interest. 8
Most nations, for example, view counterfeiting currency 9 as falling
within the aegis of protective jurisdiction. Other crimes that logi-
cally have an adverse impact on a state's national interest include
espionage, falsification of official documents, and perjury before con-
sular officials. °
Most states will assert jurisdiction over aliens for criminal acts
committed abroad where those acts affect the security of the state. 1
Specifically, U.S. courts will assert protective jurisdiction when they
view the criminal act as an affront to the sovereignty of the United
States, or as having a detrimental impact on "valid governmental
interests. 72
66. BROWNLIE, supra note 40, at 303; see also I BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION.
supra note 36, at 288 (arguing that the potential for double jeopardy and for ex post facto appli-
cation of the rule of law violates basic principles of legality).
67. 1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 26, § 402(3) cmt f. The protective principle is some-
times referred to as the "security principle." BROWNLIE, supra note 40, at 304.
68. 1 BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION, supra note 36, at 295.
69. See I RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 26, § 402 cmt. f; Harvard Research, supra note
26, at arts. 7-8 (both acknowledging that counterfeiting lies within the ambit of the protective
principle).
70. 1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 26, § 402 cmt f; see, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez,
182 F. Supp. 479 (S.D. Cal. 1960) (concerning the falsifying of statements to U.S. consular offi-
cials in order to obtain fraudulent entry into the United States); United States v. Archer, 51 F.
Supp. 708, 711 (S.D. Cal. 1943) ("[A]ny person who takes a false oath before a consul commits
an offense, not against the country where the consul is, but against the sovereignty of the United
States.").
71. BROWNLIE, supra note 40, at 304.
72. Blakesley & Lagodny, supra note 30, at 23.
[Vol. 43:449
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In United States v. Layton,73 the Ninth Circuit used protective
jurisdiction to hold that a defendant could be tried for conspiring to
murder a United States Congressman, aiding and abetting the mur-
der of a Congressman, 74 and aiding and abetting murder and at-
tempted murder of an internationally protected person,75 even
though all of the relevant events took place abroad.78 The murdered
Congressman, Representative Leo Ryan, had been investigating the
activities of an American expatriate religious cult in Guyana. The
defendant Layton, a devotee of the cult, was eventually found to
have participated in the Congressman's murder. 77
The Layton court held that the charge of attempted murder of an
internationally protected person 78 confers jurisdiction on a court
"when the crime is committed against an internationally protected
person ...who enjoys his status as such by virtue of functions
which he exercises on behalf of that State. '79 Ryan's status as an
internationally protected person implicated a strong governmental
interest of the United States. The court, therefore, was able to exer-
cise jurisdiction over the defendant without regard to his nationality,
based on the effect of the crime on the protected national interest.
United States courts have exercised jurisdiction over criminal sus-
pects based on the location of the offense or its effects, the national-
ity of the perpetrator, and the perceived vital interest jeopardized by
the crime. All of these jurisdictional tenets require some nexus be-
tween the offense or the offender and the United States. Yet another
jurisdictional theory all but ignores the territorial connection and
nationality of the perpetrator and focuses instead on the nationality
of the victim.
4. The Passive Personality Principle
The "passive personality" principle8" of jurisdiction purports to
73. 855 F.2d 1388 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1046 (1989).
74. Id. The Court relied on 18 U.S.C. § 351(d) (1988). Layton, 855 F.2d at 1394.
75. The Court also relied on 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 1116(a), 1117 (1988). Layton, 855 F.2d at 1394.
76. In addition, the court applied variants of the nationality theory and the universal theory.
See infra notes 131-144 and accompanying text (discussing overlapping jurisdictional theories).
77. See Layton, 855 F.2d at 1393-94 (discussing the so-called "Jonestown massacre").
78. 18 U.S.C § 1117 (1988).
79. Layton, 855 F.2d at 1396.
80. The passive personality principle is sometimes referred to as the "passive personal princi-
ple." See Adam W. Wegner, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Under International Law: The Yunis
Decision As A Model For The Prosecution Of Terrorists In U.S. Courts, 22 LAW & POL'Y INT'L
Bus. 409, 417 n.45 (1991) (noting that the terms "passive personality" and "passive personal"
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confer jurisdiction on a state based on the nationality of the vic-
tim."' Passive personality is thus a counterpart to the nationality
principle in that, while the latter places obligations on a state's na-
tionals no matter where they might be, the former places an obliga-
tion on other states to protect the interested state's nationals no
matter where they might be.82 In effect, the passive personality prin-
ciple allows the punishment of aliens whose acts abroad are harmful
to the forum state's nationals.8 3 As a principle, it is the least justifia-
ble of the jurisdictional bases, 4 and scholars have historically been
uncomfortable with its application. 5 The source of scholarly dis-
comfort with the passive personality principle is its potential for pro-
ducing preposterous results. If the victim's nationality were the sole
criterion for exercising extraterritorial jurisdiction, then presumably
every purse-snatching or bar fight that befell a state's national
abroad would confer jurisdiction on the victim's state.88
While many scholars have criticized the passive personality prin-
ciple, and some have even expressly repudiated it, the principle is
increasingly used to justify jurisdiction over alien criminal defend-
ants. 7 Despite earlier rejection of the passive personality principle,88
jurisdiction mean the same thing).
81. 1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 26, § 402 cmt. g.
82. 1 BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION, supra note 36, at 293.
83. BROWNLIE. supra note 40, at 303.
84. Id.; see also Harvard Research, supra note 26, at 579 ("Of all principles of jurisdiction
having some substantial support in contemporary national legislation, [the passive personality the-
ory] is the most difficult to justify in theory.").
85. See Harvard Research, supra note 26, at 445 (questioning the validity of the passive per-
sonality principle, and arguing that the passive personality principle, "asserted in some form by a
considerable number of States and contested by others, is admittedly auxiliary in character and is
probably not essential for any State if the ends served are adequately provided for on other princi-
ples"). The passive personality principle is specifically excluded from the bases of jurisdiction
listed in Articles 3 through 7. Id.
86. Wegner, supra note 80, at 427.
87. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 30(2)(1965) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (SECOND)] ("A state does not have jurisdiction
to prescribe a rule of law attaching legal consequences to conduct of an alien outside its territory
merely on the ground that the conduct affects one of its nationals.") with I RESTATEMENT
(THIRD), supra note 26, § 402 cmt. g (noting that the passive personality principle is "increas-
ingly accepted as applied to terrorist and other organized attacks on a state's nationals by reason
of their nationality, or to assassination of a state's diplomatic representatives or other officials").
88. See, e.g., The Cutting Case (1888) (citation omitted), reprinted in 2 JAMES B. MOORE, A
DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 228-42 (1906) (rejecting Mexican assertion of jurisdiction over a
United States citizen charged with libelling a Mexican national); In Re Fiedler (1940) (citation
omitted), reprinted in 6 MARJORIE WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 104 (1968). In
Fiedler, the State Department noted:
This Government continues to deny that, according to the principles of international
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the United States has, in effect, written it into law with respect to
terrorism.89 Similarly, international instruments hint at broader ap-
plications of the passive personality principle in specific contexts.90
Since these treaties are a part of United States law under the Con-
stitution, 1 the United States government clearly accepts the passive
personality principle, at least within specific contexts.
Despite its criticism, states have used the passive personality prin-
ciple, often in tandem with one or more other bases, to justify juris-
diction over foreign criminal defendants.92 In United States v.
Yunis,93 for example, the court upheld jurisdiction over a foreign
defendant charged with both violating the 1984 Act for the Preven-
tion and Punishment of the Crime of Hostage Taking"4 and "air
piracy."95 Yunis was convicted based on his participation in the hi-
jacking and later demolition of an airliner. The only connection that
these events had with the United States was that there were two
U.S. nationals aboard the plane. The district court stated that "the
Universal and Passive personality principles, together, provide am-
law, an American citizen can be justly held in Mexico to answer for an offense com-
mitted in the United States, simply because the object of that offense happens to be a
Mexican citizen, and it maintains . . . [that] the penal laws of a State, except with
regard to nationals thereof, have no extraterritorial force.
Id. (citation omitted).
89. See I RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 26, § 402 note 3 (citing the Omnibus Diplomatic
Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. § 2331 (1988), which "makes it a crime to
kill, or attempt or conspire to kill, or to cause serious bodily injury, to a national of the United
States outside the territory of the United States").
90. See, e.g., Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 197, 198
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1984/72 (1984) [hereinafter Torture Convention] ("Each State Party shall
take such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over the offences referred to
[in the convention]. . . . [w/hen the victim is a national of that State if that State considers it
appropriate.") (emphasis added); International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, G.A.
Res. 34/146, U.N GAOR 6th Comm., 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, at 245-46, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/
34/L.23 (1979) [hereinafter Hostage Taking Convention] (allowing, at Article 5, § I(d), each
signatory state to assert jurisdiction when the hostage is a national of that state).
91. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which
shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land .... ") (emphasis added).
92. See I BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION, supra note 36, at 294 (asserting that the
passive personality theory may not be relied upon as the exclusive basis for jurisdiction to pre-
scribe or enforce criminal law, but that it may be used to reinforce the jurisdictional claim of a
state where the state has another basis for jurisdiction).
93. 681 F. Supp. 896 (D.D.C. 1988), aff'd, 924 F.2d 1086 (D.C. Cir. 1991). The Yunis deci-
sion is discussed further with respect to the method used to acquire jurisdiction over the defend-
ant, as being distinct from the jurisdiction itself. See infra note 274 and accompanying text.
94. 18 U.S.C. § 1203(a) (1988).
95. 49 U.S.C. § 1472(n) (1988).
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pie grounds for [the] court to assert jurisdiction over Yunis."96 The
appellate court agreed, and held that the language of the Hostage
Taking Act clearly conferred jurisdiction based on the nationality of
the victims. 97 It found that "[u]nder the passive personality princi-
ple, a state may punish non-nationals for crimes committed against
its nationals outside of its territory, at least where the state has a
particularly strong interest in the crime." 98 Here, the court found
that the Hostage Taking Act reflected an "unmistakable congres-
sional intent" that it have extraterritorial effect. 99
Under each of the above-described theories of jurisdiction, there
must, at a minimum, exist some nexus between the state asserting
jurisdiction and the offense over which the state claims jurisdic-
tion.1"' That connection is either the location of the offense, 10 1 the
effect that the offense has on a vital state interest,'0 2 the nationality
of the offender,10 3 or the nationality of the victim.' 04 In each of
these situations the state is involved, or declares itself to be involved,
by virtue of the effect that a given behavior had on a particular
state interest. 10 5 Universal jurisdiction, in contrast, rests on the pre-
mise that certain crimes or behaviors are inherently offensive to all
nations, regardless of where they occur or who commits them.' 06
5. Universal Jurisdiction
Every state has an interest in exercising its jurisdiction over cer-
96. Yunis, 681 F. Supp at 903.
97. Yunis, 924 F.2d at 1090-91. The language the court referred to is contained in 18 U.S.C.
§ 1203(b)(1)(A) (1988), which confers jurisdiction on U.S. courts when the hostage-taking is
committed outside the United States where "the offender or the person seized or detained is a
national of the United States. ... (emphasis added).
98. Yunis, 924 F.2d at 1091.
99. Id. The Yunis decision is also significant because, for the first time, an American court
refused to be drawn into discussions of defining terrorism, and instead focused on the criminal act
itself. Compare United States v. Yunis, 681 F. Supp. 891 (D. D.C. 1988) (refusing a military
orders defense and refusing to define terrorism) with Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d
774, 823 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ("Federal courts are not in a position to determine the international
status of terrorist acts."), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985) (Robb, J., concurring) .
100. I BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION, supra note 36, at 298; Randall, supra note
44, at 788.
101. See supra notes 36-57 and accompanying text (discussing territorial jurisdiction).
102. See supra notes 67-79 and accompanying text (discussing protective jurisdiction).
103. See supra notes 58-66 and accompanying text (discussing nationality jurisdiction).
104. See supra notes 80-99 and accompanying text (discussing the passive personality
principle).
105. 1 BASSIOUNI. INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION. supra note 36, at 298.
106. Id.; Randall, supra note 44, at 788-89.
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tain universally condemned offenses. 10 7 Piracy and slave-trading are
the prototypical offenses that any state may define and punish, since
nations have historically viewed pirates and slave traders as host
humani generis - enemies of all humanity.' 08 In recent years, how-
ever, the number of crimes thought to fall within the realm of uni-
versal jurisdiction' 0 9 has increased substantially." 0
The largest expansion of universal jurisdiction began at the close
of the Second World War with the International Military Tribunals
at Nuremberg and Tokyo and the zonal tribunals in the occupied
zones of Germany."' These tribunals, as well as domestic tribunals
worldwide," 2 faced the unprecedented task of punishing criminal
behavior on a massive scale, behavior that had occurred in various
nations and on the high seas." 3 While some offenders were tried by
the states in which they committed their crimes, others were tried
by whatever state happened to catch them."1
4
At the heart of the Nuremburg tribunal's mandate for prosecut-
ing war criminals was the idea of individual responsibility." 5 The
transcript of the proceedings of the Military Tribunal at
Nuremburg is clear on this point: "Crimes against international law
are committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only by punish-
ing individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions of inter-
national law be enforced.""' 6 Thus, the Nuremburg Tribunal and
the tribunals created by the allied powers in the occupied zones re-
jected the defense of "obedience to superior orders" as an exculpa-
107. Randall, supra note 44, at 788.
108. Id.; see, e.g., United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 158 (1820) (noting that
piracy was an offense against the law of nations); United States v. LaJeune Eugenie, 26 F. Cas.
832, 843 (C.C.D. Mass. 1822) (No. 15,551) ("[V]essels and property in the possession of pirates
may be lawfully seized on the high seas by any person, and brought in for adjudication."). For a
discussion of piracy as an analogue to war crimes and to crimes against humanity, see Randall,
supra note 44, at 789-91.
109. 1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 26, § 404.
110. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND). supra note 87, § 34 (citing only piracy as an object of
universal jurisdiction) with 1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 26, § 403 (listing piracy, slave
trading, attacks on or hijacking of aircraft, genocide, war crimes, and possibly certain acts of
terrorism as falling within universal jurisdictional competence). See also Randall, supra note 44,
at 839 (arguing that universal jurisdiction is created over grave breaches of the Geneva Conven-
tions, hijacking, hostage taking, crimes against internationally protected persons, apartheid, tor-
ture, genocide, and possibly other offenses).
I1l. Randall, supra note 44, at 800-01.
112. Id. at 801-02.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 802.
115. 1 BASSIOUNI. INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION, supra note 36, at 302-03.
116. Id. at 303.
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tion for individual offenders. 17
An example of the Allied application of the universal principle of
jurisdiction is In re List." 8 In this case, a U.S. zonal tribunal tried
German officers for executing hundreds of thousands of civilians in
the Balkan region during the war. 119 The United States had no ter-
ritorial connection with the crime; that is, the crime did not occur
on territory subsequently occupied by American forces, nor were
any of the other traditional nexuses present to assert extraterritorial
jurisdiction. 20 The zonal tribunal noted that the defendants had
committed an "international crime," which the tribunal defined as
"an act universally recognized as criminal, which is considered a
grave matter of international concern and for some valid reason can-
not be left within the exclusive jurisdiction of the state that would
have control over it under ordinary circumstances."'' The court ac-
knowledged that this criminal behavior was "universally recog-
nized" and conferred jurisdiction on any state that captured the
suspects.' 22
Trials of war criminals and those charged with crimes against hu-
manity have continued to occur long after the close of World War
II. Perhaps the most dramatic trial, and the most explicit acknowl-
edgement of universal jurisdiction up to that time, was the trial of
Adolf Eichmann,121 a Gestapo official charged with mastermindingHitler's "final solution" to the "Jewish problem": the mass deporta-
117. Id. Modern international instruments have explicitly rejected the notion that an individual
offender may excuse his or her behavior by relying on the "superior orders" defense. See, e.g.,
Torture Convention, supra note 90, art. 2(3) ("An order from a superior officer or a public au-
thority may not be invoked as a justification of torture.").
118. Randall, supra note 44, at 807 n.128.
119. Id. at 807. The extremely high numbers are based on a ratio of 25 to 100 civilians exe-
cuted for every German soldier wounded or killed. id.
120. The arguments in favor of an American court asserting jurisdiction over these crimes
based on one of the traditional bases of jurisdiction would be weak. For example, there was obvi-
ously no assertion of territorial jurisdiction, since the crimes alleged neither occurred in nor had
an impact on U.S.-controlled territory. Similarly, since neither the perpetrators nor the victims
were U.S. nationals, no basis for either nationality or passive personality jurisdiction would exist.
Consequently, an assertion of protective jurisdiction would have been tenuous at best, since no
specific United States interest was implicated. Thus, the alternatives would be to allow the perpe-
trators to go free or to find another jurisdictional premise under which to prosecute the crime. The
former result is obviously counter-intuitive; it is difficult to rationalize allowing a crime of this
magnitude to go unpunished.
121. Randall, supra note 44, at 807.
122. Id. at 808.
123. Attorney General of Israel v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 18 (Isr. Dist. Ct. Jerusalem 1961),
affd, 36 1.L.R. 277 (Isr. Sup. Ct. 1962). An unofficial translation of the district court's opinion
may be found at 56 AM. J. INT'L. L. 805 (1962).
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tion and extermination of literally millions of European Jews. 124
Israeli agents had abducted Eichmann from Argentina and
brought him to Israel to stand trial."2 5 The Israeli court held that it
had jurisdiction over Eichmann based on both the universal charac-
ter of the crimes at issue and on the particular nature of the attempt
to exterminate the Jewish people.' 26 The court went on to explain
that Israeli jurisdiction was based on two sources: "[A] universal
source (pertaining to the whole of mankind) which vests the right to
prosecute and punish crimes of this order in every State within the
family of nations," and the specific affront to the State of Israel,
which gave the "victim nation" the right to try those who "as-
sault[ed her] existence."' 27
Following World War II, the notion of universally condemned of-
fenses has expanded so much that it now covers not only war crimes
and crimes against humanity,' but also certain terrorist activities
and human rights violations.' 29 These crimes are more analogous to
war crimes than to piracy, and thus continue to expand the scope of
universal jurisdiction begun by the war crimes tribunals. 30
6. Overlapping Jurisdictional Premises
The principles of international jurisdiction often substantially
overlap, and it is sometimes difficult to justify a court's reliance on
one principle over another. Often, jurisdiction in a given case might
logically be premised on more than one principle.
For example, "objective territoriality" is often difficult to distin-
guish from other bases of jurisdiction, such as the nationality princi-
124. For a powerfully written discussion of Eichmann and his crimes, see HANNAH ARENDT,
EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM: A REPORT ON THE BANALITY OF EVIL (1963).
125. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. at 219-31. Israel initially disclaimed state responsibility for the kid-
napping, asserting that the abductors were "volunteers." The Israeli government, however, later
acknowledged its involvement. I BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION, supra note 36, at 194.
126. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. at 26.
127. Id. at 50. Note that jurisdiction was premised both on the passive personality and univer-
sal jurisdiction theories.
128. See Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571 (6th Cir. 1985) (employing universal jurisdic-
tion to allow a naturalized American citizen to be extradited to Israel in order to stand trial for
crimes against humanity), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016 (1986) .
129. Randall, supra note 44, at 815; see, e.g., Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d
Cir. 1980) (equating torturers with pirates as the enemies of mankind); United States v. Layton,
509 F. Supp. 212, 223 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (noting that terrorism is as much a threat to the interna-
tional community as piracy), appeal dismissed, 645 F.2d 681 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 452 U.S.
972 (1981).
130. Randall, supra note 44, at 815.
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pie' s ' or the protective principle,"8 2 and courts sometimes couch de-
cisions in terms of objective territorial jurisdiction when another
principle of jurisdiction might be equally, or even more, appropri-
ate.' 3 In Chandler v. United States," for example, an American
citizen who had made treasonous short wave radio broadcasts to the
United States from Germany during World War II was successfully
prosecuted in the United States based on an exercise of objective
territorial jurisdiction. 35 While the objective territorial theory was
adequate under the circumstances, the Court could easily have con-
cluded that the United States had jurisdiction over Chandler under
the nationality principle' 36 since Chandler had remained a U.S. citi-
zen throughout the war. Similarly, the Court could have claimed it
had jurisdiction under the protective principle, 3 7 since propaganda
broadcasts aimed at undermining the war effort might logically have
been construed as a threat to the nation's vital interests. Finally, the
"victims" of Chandler's treasonous broadcasts were American citi-
zens, which could have brought the crime within the scope of the
passive personality principle.' 38
Assertions of nationality jurisdiction are likewise often difficult to
distinguish from protective jurisdiction' 3 9 or from extensions of the
principle of objective territoriality. 40 In United States v. Layton, " '
for example, the Ninth Circuit exercised its jurisdiction over the de-
fendant based on his nationality as well as on the protective and
universal principles of jurisdiction. 42 The court held that where a
statute described an activity that did not logically depend on its lo-
131. See supra notes 58-66 and accompanying text (discussing nationality jurisdiction).
132. See supra notes 67-79 and accompanying text (discussing the protective principle of
jurisdiction).
133. 1 BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION, supra note 36, at 261 ("Indeed, United
States courts have freely extended the territorial principle in many cases to where it would have
appeared that another theory would be appropriate.").
134. 171 F.2d 921 (1st Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 918 (1949).
135. Id. at 934.
136. See supra notes 58-66 and accompanying text (discussing nationality jurisdiction).
137. See supra notes 67-79 and accompanying text (discussing protective jurisdiction).
138. See supra notes 80-106 and accompanying text (discussing passive personality
jurisdiction).
139. See supra notes 67-79 and accompanying text (discussing protective jurisdiction).
.140. 1 BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION, supra note 36, at 261 (noting that "exten-
sions of the territorial principle have been such that it is often difficult to distinguish between
cases relying on this theory or other theories, such as protective or nationality"); see also supra
notes 53-57 and accompanying text (discussing objective territoriality).
141. 855 F.2d 1388 (9th Cir. 1988).
142. Id. at 1395-97.
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cation but which injured the U.S. government no matter where it
occurred, the statute could be applied to U.S. citizens who violated
it abroad. 143 Logically, however, if the crime is sufficiently detrimen-
tal to U.S. government interests - no matter where it occurs - to
warrant jurisdiction over a U.S. national, it is likely to be just as
harmful to the government no matter who commits it. Thus, the
objective territorial and protective theories of jurisdiction could ap-
ply to such a crime."4 '
B. Limitations on the Exercise of Jurisdiction Over Suspects
Abroad
The question of whether a state may assert a valid jurisdictional
claim over a particular act or a particular defendant is distinct from
the questions of whether and how a state should exercise that juris-
diction." 5 Assuming a valid jurisdictional premise, states are limited
to "reasonable" exercises of power with respect to extraterritorial
jurisdiction. 4 6 Furthermore, for a state to adjudicate a criminal
case successfully, whatever the jurisdictional theory, it must obtain
143. Id. at 1395.
144. See supra notes 73-79 and accompanying text (discussing United States v. Layton in more
detail).
145. If a suspect is accused of a petty offense against a private party, it may not be deemed
serious enough to warrant the expense (in either dollars or time) of formal extradition proceed-
ings. In the same instance, it is unlikely that the offended state would resort to an abduction.
Further, the offended state may deem the domestic law of the asylum state sufficient to administer
justice in the particular case.
146. 1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 26, § 403 cmt. a. Having answered the threshold
question of whether a state may exercise jurisdiction over an act or a defendant, a state may then
exercise its jurisdiction to prescribe and enforce its laws if that exercise is not "unreasonable." A
state's assertion of jurisdiction is "unreasonable" when there exists a conflict with another state's
significant interest. The "reasonableness" rule is thus an attempt to determine the proper forum
when more than one state has a basis for exercising its jurisdiction.
While the Restatement (Third) asserts that the "reasonableness" standard is widely accepted,
at least by European courts, one author disagrees. Professor Blakesley contends that "reasonable-
ness" is a term of art in Anglo-American jurisprudence, and that non-Anglo-American courts
have no contextual history with which to understand or apply the term. Thus, Anglo-American
decisions that purport to apply the "reasonableness" standard may appear arbitrary to nations
unfamiliar with the term as used in United States law. Blakesley, supra note 27, at 142.
The Restatement (Third) lists factors relevant to a state's inquiry as to whether to exercise
jurisdiction. Among these are: the extent to which the proscribed activity takes place within the
asserting state, or whether the activity has a "substantial, foreseeable impact" within the asserting
state; connections between the person responsible for the activity and the asserting state; the im-
portance of the regulation to the international political or legal order; and the likelihood of conflict
with another state's assertion of jurisdiction. 1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 26, § 403 &
cmts; see United States v. Noriega, 746 F. Supp. 1506, 1514-15 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (applying the
Restatement (Third) reasonableness rule).
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physical custody of the defendant.147
In practical terms, a valid jurisdictional premise is meaningless
without a defendant to try. A court must therefore have custody
over a criminal suspect's physical person in order to adjudicate a
criminal act effectively. The methods that states use to gain custody
over a criminal defendant range from extradition by treaty to out-
right abduction by the forum state."4 8
1. Extradition
While a comprehensive treatment of U.S. extradition practice and
policy is beyond the scope of this Note, 49 the purposes of extradi-
tion and of extradition treaties provide a necessary context for a
discussion of United States v. Alvarez-Machain.50 Further, the
question of a state's duty to extradite a fugitive from another state's
justice system raises questions of international relations and sheds
light on international cooperation in criminal matters.
Extradition is the surrender by one state to another of a person
accused or convicted of a crime under the laws of the second
state. 5' Extradition applies to those charged with crimes who have
yet to be brought to trial, to those who have fled and been convicted
in absentia,'52 and to those tried and convicted who subsequently
escape to another country. 53 It does not apply to those accused of a
crime against whom the state has not brought formal charges.15 4
Extradition has, in one form or another, existed since antiquity.' 55
147. Abraham Abramovsky & Steven J. Eagle, U.S. Policy in Apprehending Alleged Offenders
Abroad: Extradition, Abduction, or Irregular Rendition?, 57 OR. L. REV. 51, 53-54 (1977).
148. 1 BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION, supra note 36, at 189-90 (discussing legal
and extralegal alternatives to extradition).
149. For a comprehensive treatment of United States extradition policy and practice, see BAS-
SIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION, supra note 36 (both volumes).
150. 112 S. Ct. 2188 (1992).
151. WHITEMAN. supra note 88, at 727.
152. Professor Bassiouni disagrees with the contention that a conviction in absentia is valid
grounds for granting extradition. I BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION, supra note 36, at
381.
153. WHITEMAN, supra note 88, at 727.
154. Id.
155. M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 1
(1987) [hereinafter BASSIOUNI, PUBLIC ORDER]. Professor Bassiouni divides extradition practice
into four historical periods: (1) ancient practices, focusing almost entirely on religious and politi-
cal offenders; (2) the eighteenth century to mid-nineteenth century, focusing on treaties providing
for the return of military offenders and mirroring the historical character of Europe during the
period; (3) the mid-eighteenth century to the present, characterized by a common concern among
nations in suppressing criminality; and (4) the post-1948 period, emphasizing individual human
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United States extradition practice is regulated, both in substance
and procedure, by both statutes'56 and treaties. 157 Under U.S. law, a
duty to extradite exists only under the provisions of a treaty. 5 ' Typ-
ically, extradition treaties consist of: a list of extraditable of-
fenses;' 59 a list of circumstances under which extradition is prohib-
ited; 60 a general procedural framework, often including evidentiary,
rights and evincing the need for international due process of law to protect individuals in interna-
tional relations. Id. at 4-5.
156. 18 U.S.C. §j 3181, 3184-86, 3188-93, 3195 (1988). The primary extradition provision is
found in § 3184:
Whenever there is a treaty or convention for extradition between the United States
and any foreign government, any justice or judge of the United States, or any magis-
trate authorized so to do by a court of the United States . . . may, upon complaint
made under oath, charging any person found within his jurisdiction, with having com-
mitted within the jurisdiction of any such foreign government any of the crimes pro-
vided for by such treaty or convention, issue his warrant for the apprehension of the
person so charged, that he may be brought before such justice, judge, or magistrate,
to the end that the evidence of criminality may be heard and considered. . . . If, on
such hearing, he deems the evidence sufficient to sustain the charge under the provi-
sions of the proper treaty or convention, he shall certify the same, together with a
copy of all the testimony taken before him, to the Secretary of State, that a warrant
may issue upon the requisition of the proper authorities of such foreign government,
for the surrender of such person, according to the stipulations of the treaty or conven-
tion; and he shall issue his warrant for the commitment of the person so charged to
the proper jail, there to remain until such surrender shall be made.
Id. § 3184.
157. The majority of international extradition agreements are bilateral, although some states
have entered into multilateral agreements on extradition based on regional or political affinities.
BASSIOUNI. PUBLIC ORDER, supra note 155, at 14.
158. See 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1988) (providing that "[w]henever there is a treaty," a judge or
magistrate may rule on an extradition request); Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 287
(1933) (noting that absent a treaty, there is no duty to extradite).
159. The list of extraditable offenses serves not only to reinforce the concept of double criminal-
ity, but also to safeguard the requested state's interests by restricting the requesting state's lati-
tude with respect to prosecuting the surrendered fugitive. Under the doctrine of "specialty" a state
may only prosecute a person for the crimes for which he or she was extradited. Thus, in United
States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407 (1886), the Supreme Court held that under an extradition treaty
between the United States and Great Britain, a criminal defendant extradited to the United
States for murder could not be subsequently tried on additional charges once he arrived within
U.S. territory. Id. at 432.
160. A noteworthy example of a restriction on an otherwise valid extradition is the "political
offense" exception, whereby the asylum state may refuse extradition on the grounds that the of-
fense charged is of a political, rather than criminal, nature. Predictably, the political offense ex-
ception is the subject of much scholarly debate and discussion. See, e.g., I BASSIOUNI, INTERNA-
TIONAL EXTRADITION. supra note 36, at 383-453; M. Cherif Bassiouni, Ideologically Motivated
Offenses and the Political Offenses Exception in Extradition - A Proposed Juridical Standard
for an Unruly Problem, 19 DEPAUL L. REV. 217 (1969) [hereinafter Bassiouni, Proposed Judicial
Standard]; Blakesley & Lagodny, supra note 30, at 46-48; Edward M. Wise, Terrorism and the
Problems of an International Criminal Law, 19 CONN. L. REV. 799, 824-27 (1987) [hereinafter
Wise, Terrorism and Problems].
DEPA UL LA W RE VIE W
documentary, and warrant requirements; and a clause allowing for
"provisional" arrest of the accused if he or she is likely to flee before
the requesting state has provided documentation. 161 These clauses
serve as treaty-based limitations on the requesting state's ability to
obtain physical custody of a fugitive.
a. Purposes of Extradition
Historically, extradition developed as a mechanism by which one
state could obtain custody over fugitives from its laws from another
state without resorting to force. 162 In this respect, extradition serves
the international goal of promoting peaceful relations between coun-
tries. The purpose underlying extradition practice between nations
is to ensure that the goals of criminal justice are not frustrated by
the ability of criminal suspects to seek asylum in foreign coun-
tries.' 6 3 As reflected in the preamble to the U.S.-Mexico Extradition
Treaty,' the purpose of extradition is to allow the two countries
"to cooperate more closely in the fight against crime and, to this
end, to mutually render better assistance in matters of
extradition.' 65
Extradition, as a phenomenon of international law, thus evolved
primarily for the benefit of states with respect to apprehending fugi-
tives. Individuals - to the extent that they have any rights in extra-
dition practice - traditionally enjoy those rights only as derivative
rights of the requested or requesting state. 66 These individual rights
161. M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Extradition: A Summary of the Contemporary Ameri-
can Practice and a Proposed Formula, 15 WAYNE L. REV. 733, 739-750 (1969) [hereinafter Bas-
siouni, Contemporary American Practice]. For a concise comparison of American and European
extradition practices, see Blakesley & Lagodny, supra note 30, at 44-48.
162. See BASSIOUNI, PUBLIC ORDER, supra note 155, at 6 (noting that before extradition trea-
ties became common, nations often granted asylum to fugitives from other nations, with the result
that the only way the first sovereign could assert jurisdiction was by force of arms). Professor
Bassiouni notes that "[e]xtradition as an inducement to peaceful relations and friendly coopera-
tion between states remained of little practical significance until after World War I." Id.
163. Edward M. Wise, Extradition: The Hypothesis of a Civitas Maxima and the Maxim Aut
Dedere Aut Judicare, 62 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT PNAL 109 (1990) [hereinafter
Wise, Civitas Maxima]. Professor Wise further notes that, if there is an assumed common interest
among nations in crime prevention and punishment, extradition "helps to ensure that criminals do
not escape the punishment they deserve, that the preventive, educative, or expressive uses of the
criminal law are not diluted by the recurrent spectacle of offenders managing to avoid trial by
fleeing to a foreign sanctuary. It serves to close one kind of potential bolt hole." Id.
164. Extradition Treaty, May 4, 1978, U.S.-Mex., 31 U.S.T. 5061.
165. Id.
166. For a discussion of the interstate nature of extradition proceedings and the lack of individ-
ual protections, see 2 BASSIOUNI. INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION. supra note 36, at 625-36. Profes-
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have been considered ancillary and subordinate to a state's protec-
tion of its sovereign interests.1 1 7 Among the restrictions states may
impose within an extradition treaty are limitations on a contracting
state's duty to extradite its own nationals. The U.S.-Mexico Treaty
is fairly typical of United States bilateral extradition treaties with
civil law countries in this respect.16 8 Under Article Nine of the
treaty, "Neither Contracting Party shall be bound to deliver up its
own nationals."' 16 9
While the view of individual rights as subordinate to a state's sov-
ereign interests in the context of extradition has been described as
"moribund" in light of the increased emphasis on international
human rights, ° it nonetheless continues to dominate international
practice.17 ' At the heart of extradition practice is the assumption
that states have a shared interest in preventing and punishing crime,
and that this shared interest in combating crime represents a civitas
maxima: an international duty to exchange fugitives between
sor Bassiouni notes that under current practice, individual rights are derived from the treaty rights
of the respective states, and that "there is no direct right conferred upon the individual by interna-
tional extradition law which the individual can claim, let alone enforce, against either of the re-
spective states involved if these states elect to disregard them." Id. at 630; see also Blakesley &
Lagodny, supra note 30, at 44. They write:
Historically, the traditional bars to extradition were created and functioned for the
benefit of the states concerned. The individual sought for extradition benefitted, if at
all, only incidentally to the state's protection of its sovereign interests. The fugitive in
the requested state was not considered a subject of international law and therefore
possessed no individual rights. The individual was considered an object transported
from one state to the other as an exercise of the sovereign will of the two states
involved.
Id.
167. See I BASSIOUNi. INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION, supra note 36, at 194 (discussing abduc-
tions by public agents as a means of protecting sovereignty); Blakesley & Lagodny, supra note 30,
at 44 (noting that historically, "The individual sought for extradition benefitted, if at all, only
incidentally to the state's protection of its sovereign interests").
168. Typically, treaties between common law countries do not contain restrictions on extradit-
ing nationals. See, e.g., Treaty on Extradition, Dec. 3, 1971, U.S.-Can., 27 U.S.T. 983; Extradi-
tion Treaty, June 8, 1972-Oct. 21, 1976, U.S.-U.K., 28 U.S.T. 227.
169. Extradition Treaty, May 4, 1978, U.S.-Mex., 31 U.S.T. 5061, 5065.
170. Blakesley & Lagodny, supra note 30, at 44-45; see, e.g., International Convention on Civil
and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, art. 9, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 175 (outlining the basic due process
rights of criminal defendants).
171. See 2 BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION, supra note 36, at 630. Professor Bas-
siouni notes that even in the face of increased international attention to human rights, as evi-
denced by international conventions, individuals do not enjoy rights within the extradition process.
Specifically, an individual has no right to challenge a state's failure to abide by the terms of an
extradition treaty except as provided by the domestic law of the state involved. Id; see also United
States v. Najohn, 785 F.2d 1420, 1422 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that a surrendering state may
waive treaty provisions that would have created rights for an individual fugitive).
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states.7 2
b. The State's Duty to Prosecute or Extradite
As already noted, states do not have a rigid obligation under in-
ternational law to extradite every fugitive to the requesting state.17 3
Historically, a state had no duty whatever to extradite, and chose to
do so only out of comity or out of its own sense of political
expediency.' 7 4
Given that states lack enforcement authority within the territory
of other states, they must rely on those other states for enforcement
of their penal laws in what scholars refer to as the "indirect enforce-
ment" model.175 That is, states rely on the enforcement mechanisms
built into bilateral and multilateral agreements to enforce their pe-
nal interests abroad.' As a result, provisions for criminal jurisdic-
tion must be given a central role in these instruments if they are to
have any effect.'" Thus, international agreements typically levy a
duty on states either to extradite an international offender or to
prosecute the offender under their own domestic law. 178
The Torture Convention provides an example of a multilateral
agreement requiring effective domestic prosecution or extradition.17 9
After specifically defining the criminal conduct proscribed,' the
172. See 2 BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION, supra note 36, at 631 (noting that states
have mutually complementary duties to combat crime and to promote world order); Wise, Civitas
Maxima, supra note 163, at 116 (noting that humanity's common concern with "cruelty" justifies
and requires the extradition of offenders).
173. See supra notes 145-61 and accompanying text (noting the self-imposed restrictions on
and exceptions to extradition practice).
174. See 2 BASSlOUNI. INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION, supra note 36, at 629-31 (noting the
tendency of states to act within their harrow political self-interest with respect to extradition).
175. M. Cherif Bassiouni, Policy Considerations on Inter-State Cooperation in Penal Matters,
in PRINCIPLES AND PROCEDURES FOR A NEW TRANSNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 807, 811 (Albin
Eser & Otto Lagodny eds., 1991) [hereinafter Bassiouni, Inter-State Cooperation].
176. Id.
177. Id. Professor Bassiouni points out, however, that despite the importance of jurisdictional
provisions to effective international law enforcement, only 71 of the 315 international instruments
currently in force contain provisions for criminal jurisdiction. Id.
178. The duty to extradite or prosecute is often rendered in Latin, "aut dedere, aut punire" or
"punire," which means to "either surrender or punish." The term traces its roots to fourteenth
century legal scholarship. See Wise, Terrorism and Problems, supra note 160, at 110 n.3 (tracing
the historical roots of the concept). From this, Professor Bassiouni has derived the principle, "aut
dedere, aut judicare," or "either surrender or prosecute." BASSIOUNI, PUBLIC ORDER, supra note
155, at 7.
179. Torture Convention, supra note 90, arts. 5-7.
180. Id. art. 1, which provides:
For the purposes of this Convention, the term "torture" means any act by which
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Convention levies a duty on all parties to outlaw the conduct domes-
tically181 and provides for criminal jurisdiction under the territo-
rial, 182 nationality, 83 and passive personality principles. 8 The Con-
vention then mandates that, "if [a state] does not extradite [the
fugitive], [it must] submit the case to its competent authorities for
the purpose of prosecution." 8 "
Similarly, bilateral instruments often establish a duty to prosecute
or extradite. Indeed, the extradition treaty between the United
States and Mexico specifically mandates a duty to either extradite
or prosecute.' 86 In practical terms, this duty, as an incident to indi-
rect enforcement, forces states to rely on the capabilities and limita-
tions of each others' criminal justice systems.1 87 Unfortunately, no
international standards exist to regulate how states must carry out
their respective duties to prosecute or extradite. 188
severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a
person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a
confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is sus-
pected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for
any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is in-
flicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public
official or other person acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or suffer-
ing arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions.
Id.
181. Id. art. 4. ("[E]ach State Party shall ensure that all acts of torture are offences under its
criminal law."). The domestic proscription must also extend to those who are charged with com-
plicity in or participate in torture." Id.
182. Id. art. 5, § 1(a); see also supra notes 36-57 and accompanying text (discussing territorial
jurisdiction).
183. Torture Convention, supra note 90, art. 5, § 1(b); see also supra notes 58-66 and accom-
panying text (discussing nationality jurisdiction).
184. Torture Convention, supra note 90, art. 5, § 1(c); see also supra notes 80-99 and accom-
panying text (discussing the passive personality theory).
185. Torture Convention, supra note 90, art. 7.
186. See Extradition Treaty, May 4, 1978, U.S.-Mexico, 31 U.S.T. 5061, 5065 art. 9, which
provides: "If extradition is not granted pursuant to paragraph I of this Article, the requested
Party shall submit the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution, provided
that Party has jurisdiction over the offense." Id. Ironically, this clause appears in the same article
that excuses the parties from extraditing nationals, a perceived weakness in bilateral extradition
treaties. Taken together, these provisions suggest that if the offender is a national, and is thus
immune from extradition either by virtue of the treaty or by operation of domestic law, then the
requesting state would at least expect that the offender would be prosecuted under the domestic
law of the asylum state.
187. Bassiouni, Inter-State Cooperation, supra note 175, at 814.
188. Id. Professor Bassiouni argues both for recognition of the duty to prosecute or extradite
and for the development of international standards of compliance. Id. at 821.
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2. Alternate Methods of Obtaining Custody
While extradition is the legal means by which a state obtains cus-
tody over a foreign criminal defendant,' 89 circumstances exist, for
various reasons, where the forum state decides that extradition is
impractical or undesirable. If, for example, no extradition treaty ex-
ists between the asylum state and the forum state, if an offense is
not an extraditable offense within a given treaty, 90 if the crime al-
leged in the forum state is not criminal in the asylum state, 9 ' or if
the forum state believes that the asylum state will protect the of-
fender or allow him or her to escape,' 92 then the forum state may
choose an informal rendition to bring a suspect to justice. Similarly,
states may have political considerations for preferring an informal
rendition over extradition. 9 ' To a great extent, these forms of infor-
mal rendition rely on cooperation between the law enforcement
agencies of the respective states, 94 cooperation that is virtually un-
regulated by international convention.' 95 The obvious danger of ju-
dicially unsupervised, informal police coordination is the potential
that it possesses for abuses of human rights and privacy and for
189. See I BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION, supra note 36, at 189 ("The title of [the
chapter on abduction and unlawful seizure as alternatives to extradition] does not suggest that
alternatives to extradition means extradition other than by treaty.").
190. Id. at 329-35. Extraditable offenses are either specifically enumerated in the extradition
treaty itself or derived from a formula which looks at the facts as charged and determines whether
these would support a criminal charge under the laws of the asylum state. Id.; see also Abramov-
sky & Eagle, supra note 147, at 51 n.1 (further explaining the principle of "double criminality,"
which makes extradition available if an act is criminal in both nations). Some multilateral agree-
ments, including the Torture Convention, specifically prescribe particular offenses that are
"deemed to be included as extraditable offences in any extradition treaty existing between States
Parties." Torture Convention. supra note 90, art. 8.
191. For a discussion of the requirement of "double criminality" under current extradition
practice, see I BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION, supra note 36, at 324-58.
192. See Abraham D. Sofaer, The Sixth Annual Waldemar A. Solf Lecture in International
Law: Terrorism, the Law, and the National Defense, 126 MIL. L. REV. 89, 112 (Fall 1989) (not-
ing possible state justifications for extraterritorial abductions in violation of international law as a
matter of self-defense).
193. See Transcript of Proceedings, A National Security Conference Strengthening the Rule
of Law in the War Against Drugs and Narco Terrorism (Washington, D.C., Oct. 11, 1990),
reprinted in 15 NOVA L. REv. 795, 851 (1991) [hereinafter Security Conference] (statement of
Mr. diGenova) (alluding to situations in which a country's internal political situation might cause
it to prefer the irregular rendition of a criminal suspect over formal extradition).
194. See id. at 843 (statement of Judge Sofaer) (noting the extensive cooperation between U.S.
law enforcement agencies and their foreign counterparts in the arena of narcotics enforcement).
195. Bassiouni, Inter-State Cooperation, supra note 175, at 812. Not even the International
Criminal Police Organization ("ICPO-INTERPOL"), which has existed since 1923, is regulated
by anything approaching treaty status. Instead, ICPO-INTERPOL relies on the voluntary cooper-
ation of local police agencies within the host nation. Id.
JUSTIFIABLE ABDUCTION
breaches of national sovereignty.196
Alternatively, states may choose an informal method of rendition
simply because the extradition process in most countries is procedur-
ally burdensome and slow, 197 or because the asylum state's domestic
law forbids the extradition of nationals to foreign countries.' 98 In
these cases, states find alternate means of obtaining custody of a
suspect attractive.
The informal means that states use to obtain jurisdiction over for-
eign defendants generally fall within two broad categories: the "ab-
duction of a person by agents of a state other than the asylum state
without the knowledge or connivance of the asylum state; and...
[the] seizure of a person by agents of one state and his or her subse-
quent surrender to the agents of another state without benefit of
legal process."' 99
196. Id. at 813. The conduct of the Camarena investigation demonstrated each of these short-
comings, including the breach of Mexican sovereignty. The Camarena investigation is discussed
infra at notes 298-354 and accompanying text.
197. See generally 2 BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION, supra note 36, at 501-631
(providing a detailed discussion of extradition procedures under U.S. law). The process is long
because it requires interaction of bureaucratic procedures, administrative tribunals, and, poten-
tially, judicial habeas corpus proceedings in federal court and all attendant appeals of right and
discretion. Id. An illustrative example is the case of Joseph Doherty, a member of the Provisional
Irish Republican Army, who escaped in 1981 from Great Britain where he had been convicted for
the 1980 ambush and murder of a British Army officer in Northern Ireland. He fled to the United
States, entered the country illegally, and was eventually arrested by agents of the Immigration
and Naturalization Service in 1983. Doherty's case took nine years and six court cases to resolve.
He was extradited to Great Britain in 1991 and is currently serving a life sentence in a British
prison. For an incisive analysis of the Doherty cases and the doctrine of nonrefoulment (the right
of refugees not to be returned to a country where they may face persecution), see Wendy L. Fink,
Note, Joseph Doherty and the INS: A Long Way to International Justice, 41 DEPAUL L. REV.
927 (1992). As Professor Bassiouni aptly points out, however, if the problem is that the extradi-
tion laws are inefficient, then the solution is to improve the laws, not to subvert them. I BASSIOUNI,
INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION. supra note 36, at 190.
198. The Mexican Constitution, for example, limits the extradition of Mexican citizens to for-
eign countries. CONSTITUCION POLITICA DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS MEXICANOS art. 15, cited in
Abraham Abramovsky, Extraterritorial Abductions: America's "Catch and Snatch" Policy Run
Amok, 31 VA. J. INT'L L. 151, 161 n.42 (1991) [hereinafter Abramovsky, Abductions].
199. 1 BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION, supra note 36, at 189. Professor O'Higgins
developed a substantially more-elaborate scheme for classifying alternatives to extradition:
1. Recovery of a fugitive in violation of international law:
i. seizure in violation of customary international law;
ii. seizure in violation of conventional international law.
2. Apprehension of a fugitive in one state's territory by nationals of another state, as
private individuals, with the assistance or connivance of the asylum state's officials.
3. Apprehension of a fugitive in one state's territory by nationals of another state, as
private individuals, without the assistance or connivance of the asylum state.
4. Irregular apprehension of a fugitive in one state by one of that state's officials prior
to the subject's extradition to a second state.
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These techniques of "extraordinary apprehension '"200 owe their
existence to the Latin maxim mala captus, bene detentus (a bad
capture is a good detention), 0 1 by which states will exercise in per-
sonam jurisdiction over a criminal defendant without regard for how
he or she was apprehended. Thus, there is no real deterrent to ex-
traordinary apprehension since the criminal proceeding is considered
legally valid and its result is upheld by the courts. 2
This is not to suggest that abductions are, therefore, legal under
international law. On the contrary, abductions virtually always vio-
late international law at least to the extent that they violate a na-
tion's sovereignty.2oa Abductions by United States law enforcement
agencies implicate three bodies of law: the domestic law of the asy-
lum state, the domestic law of the United States, and customary
5. Mistaken surrender of a fugitive by one state to another.
Paul O'Higgins, Unlawful Seizure and Irregular Extradition, 36 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 279, 280
(1960).
200. Abramovsky & Eagle, supra note 147, at 52.
201. 1 BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION, supra note 36, at 190.
202. Id. There was one attempt to place limitations on the rights of states to prosecute criminal
defendants abducted from another sovereign's territory. Harvard Research, supra note 26, at 623
art. 16. The Harvard researchers proposed adding the following language to temper the effect of
"mala captus bene detentus".
In exercising jurisdiction under this [draft convention], no State shall prosecute or
punish any person who has been brought within its territory . . . by recourse to mea-
sures in violation of international law or international convention without first ob-
taining the consent of the State or States whose rights have been violated by such
measures.
id.
203. See Kidnapping Suspects Abroad: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitu-
tional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1992) [hereinafter
House Hearings] (statement of Judge Sofaer) (noting that extraterritorial abductions "almost
always violate international law because of the violation of territorial integrity that is involved,"
and carving out a very narrow exception for extreme cases of terror violence where all other
international remedies have failed); 1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 26, § 433(l)(a) (noting
that U.S. law enforcement agents are authorized to "exercise their functions in the territory of
another state only with the consent of the other state"); Abramovsky & Eagle, supra note 147, at
64 (arguing that the U.S. policy of extraterritorial abductions is illegal under international law);
Sofaer, supra note 192, at 110 (noting the general illegality of international abduction); see also
House Hearings, supra, at 33 (statement of Prof. Steinhardt) (stating that abductions are "obvi-
ously illegal" and frustrate the purposes of extradition); id. at 7-8 (statement of Prof. Lowenfeld)
(noting that there is "virtual unanimity on the proposition that abduction ...by agents of one
state in the territory of another without that state's consent is a violation of international law");
id. at 62 (statement of Prof. Glennon) (stating that the prohibition against unilateral state-spon-
sored abductions is "about as fundamental a principle of international law as you can get"). Pro-
fessor Glennon went on to acknowledge the possibility of a very narrow exception implicated by a
nation's right to self-defense, but argued that the exception did not have the status of customary
international law. Id.
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international law.204 The domestic laws of the asylum state will, of
course, vary with each case; however, virtually every country has
domestic laws against kidnapping.2 °0 As a matter of U.S. domestic
law, the doctrine of mala captus, bene detentus has been, with very
narrow exceptions, ensconced for more than one hundred years.
a. The Ker-Frisbie Doctrine
The U.S. Supreme Court first evaluated the legality of extraterri-
torial abductions in Ker v. Illinois.2 °0 In that case, the state of Illi-
nois indicted the defendant for embezzlement and larceny while he
was living in Peru. 07 The governor of Illinois made a written re-
quest to the U.S. State Department to issue a warrant for Ker's
return under the terms of an extradition treaty between the United
States and Peru.20 ' The President issued the warrant and authorized
an agent to retrieve the defendant from the Peruvian authorities. 09
The agent, however, did not serve the papers on the Peruvian gov-
ernment and instead forcibly abducted the defendant and placed
him aboard a U.S. ship bound for Honolulu.21 0 From there, the de-
fendant was placed on another ship and taken to San Francisco,
where authorities honored a request for his return to Illinois.21 Illi-
204. Security Conference, supra note 193, at 841 (statement of Judge Sofaer) (stating that
where a seizure does not occur in international waters, three sets of laws are involved).
205. See Sofaer, supra note 192, at 110 (noting that U.S.-sponsored abductions would likely
violate the asylum country's domestic laws and could subject U.S. agents to criminal prosecution
in that country).
206. 119 U.S. 436 (1886). The Supreme Court's only previous opinion on a related topic was
The Ship Richmond v. United States, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 102 (1815). In that case, a U.S. war-
ship seized a U.S.-flagged ship in Spanish territorial waters off the coast of Florida for failure to
pay a required bond prior to its original sailing. The Supreme Court rejected the appellant's argu-
ment that because the seizure was in violation of international law it should deprive the court of
its jurisdiction. The Court noted that the seizure was an offense against the foreign sovereign, and
therefore had no effect on the court's power over the ship. Id. at 104. Other U.S. courts had dealt
with the issue of personal abduction prior to Ker. See, e.g., State v. Brewster, 7 Vt. 118, 121
(1835) (holding that, in a case where a criminal defendant was abducted from his home in Ca-
nada to stand trial in Vermont, "it [wa]s not for [the court] to inquire by what means or in what
precise manner, [the defendant had] been brought within the reach of justice").
207. Ker, 119 U.S. at 437.
208. Id. at 438; see 18 Stat. 719 (1874) (delineating the extradition treaty in force at that
time).
209. Ker, 119 U.S. at 438.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 438-39. As it happened, Peru was at war with Chile when the agent arrived, and
Chilean forces occupied virtually all of Peru. One could argue that, under the circumstances, there
was no Peruvian government in control on whom the agent might have served the extradition
request. See Charles Fairman, Comment, Ker v. Illinois Revisited, 47 AM. J. INT'L L. 678 (1953)
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nois tried and convicted the defendant, and he appealed to the state
supreme court, which affirmed the conviction.212 He then appealed
on a writ of error to the U.S. Supreme Court, arguing that his re-
moval from Peru violated the mutual extradition treaty between the
United States and Peru.21 He also argued that Peruvian residence
gave him a right of asylum, and thus he could only be removed
under the provisions of the treaty.214
The Supreme Court rejected this argument and held that "'due
process of law' . . . is complied with when the party is regularly
indicted by the proper grand jury in the State Court, has a trial
according to the forms and modes prescribed for such trials, and
when, in that trial and proceedings, he is deprived of no rights to
which he is lawfully entitled."2 5 The Court further held that the
defendant's "forcible abduction [wa]s no[t a] sufficient reason why
the party should not answer when brought within the jurisdiction of
the court which ha[d] the right to try him for such an offence. "216
The Court reaffirmed its holding in Ker, that forcible abduction
does not deprive a court of personal jurisdiction over a defendant, in
Frisbie v. Collins21  some sixty-six years later. In Frisbie, the de-
fendant contended that his forcible abduction from Illinois to Michi-
gan to stand trial violated his due process rights under the Four-
teenth Amendment and the Federal Kidnapping Act.218  The
Supreme Court again rejected the defendant's arguments and held:
This court has never departed from the rule announced in Ker ... that the
power of a court to try a person for crime is not impaired by the fact that he
had been brought within the court's jurisdiction by reason of a "forcible
abduction." . . . [D]ue process of law is satisfied when one present in court
(detailing additional facts surrounding the Ker case).
212. Ker, 119 U.S. at 439.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 441.
215. Id. at 440.
216. Id. at 444. Professors Abramovsky and Eagle note the irony that the Ker decision, which
is consistently relied upon to justify extralegal apprehension, began with a good faith attempt to
exercise the provisions of an extradition treaty. Abramovsky & Eagle, supra note 147, at 55. For
an analysis of extraterritorial application of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, see
Lea Brillmayer & Charles Norchi, Federal Extraterritoriality and Fifth Amendment Due Pro-
cess, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1217 (1992) (concluding that courts should recognize Fifth Amendment
limitations on choice of law in the context of extraterritorial applications of law in the same
manner in which courts treat interstate choice of law models under the Fourteenth Amendment).
217. 342 U.S. 519 (1952).
218. Id. at 520 n.2.
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is convicted of crime after having been fairly apprized of the charges against
him and after a fair trial in accordance with constitutional procedural
safeguards.
19
While one might interpret Ker as a reaction to a unique factual
situation, its continued application tends to establish that non-in-
quiry into the means used to assert jurisdiction over a criminal de-
fendant is a fixture of American law.220 One might also argue that
the Ker-Frisbie doctrine lends judicial support to a policy of ex-
traordinary apprehension of criminal suspects. 2
219. Id. at 522.
220. Abramovsky & Eagle, supra note 147, at 55. The Ker holding has been followed consist-
ently in virtually all of the federal courts. See, e.g., INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984)
(holding that a defendant's person is never considered a "suppressible fruit" of an unlawful ar-
rest); United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463 (1980) (explaining that a defendant may not object to
his presence at trial as a result of an illegal arrest); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975) (hold-
ing that an arrest based on probable cause is not invalidated due to other failures of police proce-
dure); United States v. Yunis, 924 F.2d 1086 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (finding that the defendant's ab-
duction by U.S. law enforcement officers in international waters did not deprive the court of
jurisdiction); United States v. Cordero, 668 F.2d 32 (1st Cir. 1981) (holding that a defendant's
forced return to the U.S. from Panama did not require the court to divest itself of jurisdiction);
United States v. Lara, 539 F.2d 495 (5th Cir. 1976) (explaining that a forcible abduction does not
require the district court to divest itself of jurisdiction); United States ex rel. Lujan v. Gengler,
510 F.2d 62 (2d Cir. 1975) (holding that the manner in which the defendant was brought to trial
did not affect the court's jurisdictional competence to proceed), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1001
(1975); United States v. Lira, 515 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1974) (finding that the abduction of the
defendant in Chile did not affect the district court's ability to adjudicate the case), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 847 (1975); United States v. Herrera, 504 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1974) (holding that an
illegal arrest in Peru did not invalidate subsequent proceedings in the United States); United
States ex rel. Calhoun v. Twomey, 454 F.2d 326 (7th Cir. 1971) (finding that the return of a
prisoner from Iowa to Illinois without an extradition hearing did not deprive Illinois courts of
jurisdiction); Bacon v. United States, 449 F.2d 933 (9th Cir. 1971) (holding that the involuntary
presence of a material witness in a grand jury proceeding does not affect a court's jurisdiction);
Autry v. Wiley, 440 F.2d 799 (1st Cir. 1971) (noting that the violation of Canadian law in secur-
ing the defendant's rendition did not impair the U.S. court's jurisdiction), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
886 (1971); Government of the Virgin Islands v. Ortiz, 427 F.2d 1043 (3d Cir. 1970) (finding
that the defendant's involuntary removal from Puerto Rico to the Virgin Islands without a war-
rant did not violate any Constitutional guarantees); Hobson v. Crouse, 332 F.2d 561 (10th Cir.
1964) (explaining that an unlawful extradition between states did not invalidate the proceedings
in the second state); United States ex. rel. Moore v. Martin, 273 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1959) (up-
holding jurisdiction despite the defendant's forcible abduction from Florida to Pennsylvania), cert.
denied, 363 U.S. 821 (1960); Chandler v. United States, 171 F.2d 921 (1st Cir. 1948) (upholding
prosecution despite the forcible, involuntary return of the defendant from Europe to the United
States), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 918 (1949); United States v. Noriega, 746 F.Supp. 1506 (S.D. Fla.
1990) (holding that the defendant's seizure in Panama did not affect the court's authority to try
him). But see United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974) (finding that the govern-
ment's "outrageous" conduct in abducting the defendant deprived the court of jurisdiction). The
Toscanino "exception" to the Ker-Frisbie rule is discussed infra at notes 239-61 and accompany-
ing text.
221. Abramovsky & Eagle, supra note 147, at 55.
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b. Exceptions to the Ker-Frisbie Doctrine
Despite the uniform application of the Ker-Frisbie doctrine,222
courts have carved out narrow exceptions based on violations of U.S.
treaty obligations and violations of the due process rights of individ-
ual defendants. Neither of these exceptions to the Ker-Frisbie doc-
trine have, however, enjoyed widespread application.
i. Treaty Violations
While violations of a law or treaty generally do not require a
court to divest itself of jurisdiction,228 courts have nonetheless held
that where the United States has violated a specific treaty provision,
a court may refuse jurisdiction. 24 Absent a specific treaty provision,
however, the Supreme Court has been reluctant to imply a provision
which would invalidate its jurisdiction.22 One such case was United
States v. Rauscher.226
In Rauscher, decided on the same day as Ker, the Supreme Court
held that a criminal defendant, extradited under the terms of an
extradition treaty for a particular crime, could not be subsequently
prosecuted for a different crime.227 The defendant in Rauscher was
a British citizen extradited to the United States for a murder com-
mitted aboard a U.S. vessel on the high seas.228 Upon arrival in the
United States, Rauscher was tried for inflicting cruel and unusual
punishment.229 It did not make sense, the Court reasoned, to estab-
lish an enumerated list of extraditable offenses, with evidentiary re-
quirements in the asylum state, only to surrender the fugitive to the
requesting state "free from all the positive requirements and just
implications of the treaty under which the transfer of his person
222. See supra note 220 and accompanying text (noting the consistent adherence of courts to
Ker-Frisbie and subsequent cases).
223. See supra note 220 and accompanying text (discussing cases in which courts did not divest
themselves of jurisdiction due to violations of either a law or treaty).
224. See Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102 (1933) (holding that a violation of a specific
jurisdictional limitation within a treaty required the Court to divest itself of jurisdiction); Ford v.
United States, 273 U.S. 593, 611 (1927) ("If [a defendant] committed an offense against the
United States and [its laws], [the defendant] can not escape conviction, unless the treaty affirma-
tively confers on [him] immunity from prosecution.") (emphasis added).
225. United States v. Najohn, 785 F.2d 1420, 1422 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1009
(1986); United States v. F/V Taiyo Maru, 395 F. Supp. 413, 418-19 (D. Me. 1975).
226. 119 U.S. 407 (1886).
227. Id. at 423.




[took] place. '2 30 Thus, the Court was willing to imply a term to a
treaty when the transfer took place under that treaty's terms.
Apart from violations of specific provisions within a treaty, an-
other line of cases argues that extradition treaties provide the exclu-
sive means by which a state may acquire jurisdiction over a defend-
ant. In United States v. Valot,231 the defendant was a U.S. citizen
jailed in Thailand on narcotics charges.232 Upon his release from
jail, Thai authorities delivered him to American officials in Bang-
kok, who escorted him to the United States to face additional
charges.233 The defendant argued that his apprehension outside the
terms of the U.S*-Thailand extradition treaty violated the treaty
since it was meant to be the exclusive means of rendering fugitives
between the two states.2 34 The Ninth Circuit rejected this argument
and held that the facts of the case put it squarely within the ambit
of Ker.235 The court further held that if the United States does not
make an extradition request, and the defendant is merely deported
by the asylum state, "no 'extradition' has occurred and failure to
comply with the extradition treaty does not bar prosecution. '236
Even assuming that a defendant's presence violates the express or
implied terms of an extradition treaty, the courts have been reluc-
tant to interfere with the foreign affairs power constitutionally re-
served to the political branches of government. 7 This deference to
230. Id. at 421.
231. 625 F.2d 308 (9th Cir. 1980).
232. Id. at 309.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 310.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. See, e.g., Chinese Exclusion Case (Chae Chan Ping v. United States), 130 U.S. 581
(1889) (holding that it was beyond the power of the judiciary to rule on the legitimacy of the
executive's decision to disregard a treaty with a foreign sovereign); Mahon v. Justice, 127 U.S.
700 (1888) (noting that the question of whether to return a fugitive unlawfully brought to the
forum state was beyond the competence of the judiciary); United States v. Sobell, 142 F. Supp.
515 (S.D. N.Y. 1956) (holding that extradition was not the exclusive means for exchanging fugi-
tives between states, and that the decision by one state to bypass the treaty in favor of an alter-
nate form of rendition was a question for the political branches), aff d, 244 F.2d 520 (2d Cir.
1956), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 873 (1957); United States v. Insull, 8 F. Supp. 310 (N.D. II1. 1934)
(finding that the court had no power to examine a complaint from a foreign sovereign over a
defendant's abduction, as that would have raised questions for the executive); Ex Parte Lopez, 6
F. Supp. 342 (S.D. Tex. 1934) (finding that the Mexican government's protest over the abduction
of one of its citizens was a matter for the executive branch); United States v. Unverzagt, 299 F.
1015 (W.D. Wash. 1924) (noting that a foreign sovereign's complaint about the defendant's ab-
duction from British Columbia to the United States raised a political question for the executive
branch), aff'd sub nom. Unverzagt v. Benn, 5 F.2d 492 (9th Cir. 1924), cert. denied, 269 U.S.
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policy-makers demonstrates the need for consistency in foreign af-
fairs pronouncements.238
ii. Due Process Challenges
In United States v. Toscanino,239 the Second Circuit carved out
what would seem like an exception to the Ker-Frisbie rule of non-
inquiry. In Toscanino, a Uruguayan police officer alleged to be
working for the U.S. government kidnapped the defendant, an Ital-
ian national, and took him to Brazil.24 1 There, Brazilian police, with
at least the tacit approval of U.S. agents, tortured the defendant for
seventeen days. 241 The Brazilian authorities eventually sent the de-
fendant to New York, where U.S. authorities arrested him. 42 The
defendant was tried and convicted on narcotics-related charges in
New York,243 where the district court denied his motion to vacate
the jury verdict and repatriate him to Uruguay. 4
The Second Circuit framed the issue on appeal as "whether a fed-
eral court must assume jurisdiction over the person of a defendant
who [wa]s illegally apprehended abroad and forcibly abducted by
government agents to the United States for the purpose of facing
criminal charges [in the United States]. ''243 While it acknowledged
judicial adherence to the Ker-Frisbie doctrine, the Second Circuit
questioned the continued validity of the doctrine in light of the ex-
panded scope of judicial inquiry into the due process aspects of pre-
trial procedures. 246 Relying on the Supreme Court's decisions in
566 (1925).
238. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936) (holding
that the conduct of foreign affairs requires a "unity of design").
239. 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974).
240. Id. at 270.
241. Id. Toscanino alleged that he was beaten, deprived of sleep, held incommunicado, and
subjected to various forms of beatings and torture for the entire period he spent in Brazil. He
further claimed that U.S. agents of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs participated in
at least some of the brutality, and that the U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of New York
received regular progress reports on the defendant's interrogation. Id. Procedurally, the court con-
sidered Toscanino's claim on an appeal from a motion to dismiss, which the lower court had
denied without a hearing. The Court of Appeals, therefore, viewed Toscanino's allegations as true
for purposes of appeal. Id. at 269-71.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 269. Toscanino was convicted of conspiracy to import narcotics in violation of 21
U.S.C. §§ 173-74 (1956). Toscanino, 500 F.2d at 268-69.
244. Id. at 271.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 275.
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Rochin v. California24 7 and Mapp v. Ohio, 48 the court found that
the Frisbie formulation249 could no longer bar a court's inquiry into
the method used to bring a defendant to justice. °50 The court ex-
pressed its expanded view of due process, stating, "[W]e view due
process as now requiring a court to divest itself of jurisdiction over
the person of a defendant where it has been acquired as the result of
the government's deliberate, unnecessary and unreasonable invasion
of the accused's constitutional rights."2 51 Allowing a defendant to
stand trial in the face of such extreme governmental misconduct
represents the "fruits of the government's exploitation of its own
misconduct." '252 The government's abduction of the defendant in vio-
lation of his Fourth Amendment rights required the court, in the
interest of "fundamental fairness," '253 to return the defendant to the
status quo ante.2 54 Thus, the court held that if a defendant could
prove deliberate, reprehensible government misconduct, due process
would require the district court to divest itself of jurisdiction. 55
This assault on the Ker-Frisbie doctrine did not last long. In
United States ex rel. Lujan v. Gengler,256 a case arising out of the
same alleged conspiracy involved in Toscanino, the Second Circuit
held that the defendant's extraordinary apprehension did not violate
due process. There were, however, significant factual distinctions be-
tween Lujan and Toscanino. In Lujan, although the defendant had
been extraordinarily apprehended in Bolivia by Bolivian police act-
ing as agents of the U.S. government, the defendant made no alle-
gations of torture or extreme misconduct by U.S. agents. 5 As in
247. 342 U.S. 165 (1952) (holding that pumping a suspect's stomach for narcotics is an illegal
search and seizure and violates the Due Process Clause).
248. 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (holding that all evidence obtained by illegal searches and seizures is
inadmissible in a criminal trial).
249. Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952).





255. Id. On remand, the district court held that the defendant could not prove his allegations of
extreme government misconduct, and thus the court had proper jurisdiction. United States v. Tos-
canino, 398 F. Supp. 916 (E.D.N.Y. 1975). The inability of the defendant to prove his assertions
demonstrated the factual problems inherent in proving an international abduction. It is exceed-
ingly difficult to sort fact from fiction in both the government's and defendant's versions of events.
The factual difficulties of abduction cases caused Professor Lowenfeld to comment, "I don't be-
lieve anybody in any of these cases. ... Security Conference, supra note 193, at 848.
256. 510 F.2d 62 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1001 (1975).
257. Id. at 66.
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Toscanino, the defendant urged that his extraordinary apprehension
had deprived him of due process, and therefore divested the federal
courts of jurisdiction.2 58 While the court recognized that the judicial
system could not blind itself to the manner in which the defendant
was brought to justice, it nonetheless refused to reject Ker-Frisbie
entirely:
Yet in recognizing that Ker and Frisbie no longer provided a carte blanche
to government agents bringing defendants from abroad to the United States
by the use of torture, brutality and similar outrageous conduct, we did not
intend to suggest that any irregularity in the circumstances of a defendant's
arrival in the jurisdiction would vitiate the proceedings of the criminal court.
In holding that Ker and Frisbie must yield to the extent they were inconsis-
tent with the Supreme Court's more recent pronouncements we scarcely
could have meant to eviscerate the Ker-Frisbie rule, which the Supreme
Court has never felt impelled to disavow. 69
While Toscanino seemed to provide a valid exception to the Ker-
Frisbie doctrine, in practice it has been rendered "virtually mean-
ingless."2 60 No court has subsequently applied the Toscanino test
and concluded that the government's conduct was sufficiently "out-
rageous" so as to divest the court of jurisdiction.26' Toscanino thus
stands as an anomaly to the U.S. judiciary's otherwise uniform ap-
plication of Ker-Frisbie.
A court's legal ability to prosecute a defendant abducted in a for-
eign country is distinct from the executive's willingness to abduct a
defendant. As a matter of policy, the executive - through its law
enforcement agencies - must determine the practical advisability
and the political implications of an international abduction.
C. Developments in U.S. Policy on Extraordinary Apprehensions
As noted above, U.S. courts have consistently applied Ker-Frisbie
to cases of "extraordinary apprehension" of criminal suspects de-
258. Id.
259. Id. at 65.
260. Abramovsky, Abductions, supra note 198, at 160.
261. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975) (referring to Ker-Frisbie and holding that an
illegal arrest did not render a conviction void); United States v. Cordero, 668 F.2d 32 (1st Cir.
1981) (finding that the defendant's allegations of poor treatment in a Panamanian jail failed to
rise to the level necessary to invoke the Toscanino exception); United States v. Lopez, 542 F.2d
283 (5th Cir. 1976) (refusing to apply Toscanino in the 5th Circuit); United States v. Lara, 539
F.2d 495 (5th Cir. 1976) (questioning whether Toscanino was good law in the circuit, and refus-
ing in any event to apply it to the facts of the case); United States v. Lira, 515 F.2d 68 (2d Cir.




spite strong academic criticism.262 United States policy in this re-
gard has, over the past decade, become increasingly aggressive. The
reasons for this increased willingness to abduct defendants abroad
for prosecution in this country reflect a growing frustration with
traditional means of exercising jurisdiction over foreign defendants
in light of increasing drug trafficking and terrorism.263 This frustra-
tion has led to a correspondingly permissive attitude with respect to
law enforcement efforts to bring criminals to justice.2"4 The relaxed
attitude of U.S. policy-makers with respect to extraordinary appre-
hension is reflected both in the evolution of U.S. policy during the
1980s, and in the conduct of the Camarena murder investigation
itself.26
1. Evolution of U.S. Policy on Extraterritorial Law Enforcement
in the 1980s
On June 21, 1989, the United States Department of Justice
("DOJ") issued a legal opinion concluding that the President has
the authority to order the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI")
(and, by extension, any executive law enforcement agency) to arrest
individuals for violations of U.S. law in foreign countries without
that country's consent. 26  This opinion reversed a previous DOJ
262. See, e.g., I BASSIOUNI. INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION, supra note 36, at 193 (noting that
Ker is often applied to factual situations to which it does not apply); Abramovsky, Abductions,
supra note 198, at 156 ("Ker was a judicial fluke and continued reliance upon it for our national
policy is sheer folly."); Abramovsky & Eagle, supra note 147 (setting forth a generally critical
view of the Ker-Frisbie rationale).
263. Abramovsky, Abductions, supra note 198, at 155-56.
264. Id. While a detailed discussion of the case is beyond the scope of this Note, a notable
illustration of the lengths to which the United States is willing to go to bring criminal suspects to
trial is the December 1989 invasion of Panami aimed at securing the presence of General Manuel
Antonio Noriega to stand trial in the United States. See United States v. Noriega, 746 F. Supp.
1506, 1511-13 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (setting forth the facts of the case and noting that at least one
mission of the invading forces was to arrest Noriega). The case also provides an interesting discus-
sion of the objective territorial theory of jurisdiction as applied to Noriega. Id. at 1512-13.
265. See infra notes 298-354 and accompanying text (discussing the Camarena investigation).
266. The Justice Department memorandum is unpublished. To glean a general explanation of
the opinion see, The Legality as a Matter of Domestic Law of Extraterritorial Law Enforcement
Activities That Depart From International Law: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Civil and
Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) (state-
ment of William Barr, Ass't. Atty. Gen) and The International Law and Foreign Policy Implica-
tions of Extraterritorial Law Enforcement Activities: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Civil
and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989)
(statement of Abraham Sofaer). The record of their testimony is likewise not published, although
it is available for inspection at room 806, House Annex Number One, Washington, D.C. The
author of this Note has relied on secondary sources for his discussion of the testimony of these
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opinion concerning the FBI's authority to conduct extraterritorial
arrests, written in 1980 near the close of the Carter
administration.6 7
This 1980 opinion had held that although "the question [wa]s not
free from doubt, we conclude that the FBI only has lawful authority
[to apprehend a suspect abroad for violating U.S. law] when the
asylum state acquiesces to the proposed operation. 268 In reaching
this conclusion, the Carter administration memorandum relied on
Chief Justice John Marshall's formulation in Schooner Exchange v.
McFaddon:219 "All exceptions, therefore, to the full and complete
power of a nation within its own territories, must be traced up to the
consent of the nation itself. They can flow from no other legitimate
source." 270 The Carter administration memorandum further relied
on a rule of statutory construction that allows a government agency
to use "all reasonable and necessary means" to accomplish its statu-
tory duty. It was hardly "reasonable," the memorandum concluded,
to assume that Congress had intended that the FBI violate interna-
tional law under its authority to conduct arrests. The implication of
this memorandum was that one nation does not have the authority
under international law to violate the territorial integrity of another
state."'
The Carter administration's opinion that extraterritorial law en-
forcement requires the asylum state's permission was eroded by two
pieces of legislation in the 1980s,2 7 2 both of which extended the
FBI's authority to investigate crime abroad when a U.S. national
gentlemen. See Major Richard Pregent, Presidential Authority to Displace Customary Interna-
tional Law, 129 MIL. L. REv. 77 (1990); Michael R. Pontoni, Comment, Authority of the United
States to Extraterritorially Apprehend and Lawfully Prosecute International Drug Traffickers
and Other Fugitives, 21 CAL. W. INT'L. L.J. 215 (1990); Richard Downing, Recent Development,'
The Domestic and International Legal Implications of the Abduction of Criminals From Foreign
Soil, 26 STAN. J. INT'L. L. 573 (1990); see also Monroe Leigh, Comment, Editorial Comment: Is
the President Above Customary International Law?, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 757 (1992) (noting that
the Department of State has refused all requests, even one from Congress itself, for the "Barr
Memorandum"). Requests for the memorandum under the Freedom of Information Act
("FOIA") have been similarly unsuccessful, and the State Department has refused such requests
under various exceptions. Leigh's own FOIA request is the subject of a suit pending in federal
district court. Id.
267. U.S. Dep't of Justice, Extraterritorial Apprehension by the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion, 4B Op. Off. Legal Counsel 543 (1980).
268. Id. at 544.
269. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
270. Id. at 136.




falls victim to a terrorist act."' This legislation resulted in more
aggressive law enforcement efforts abroad, including the capture of
Fawaz Yunis in 1987.274
The 1989 DOJ opinion, written by then-Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral William Barr, relied on two bases for reaching a conclusion
diametrically opposed to the 1980 pronouncement: United States
case law and the constitutional requirement that the President
"shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed. 27 5 Ironically,
the 1989 opinion relied first on Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon,7 6
the very case relied on in 1980 to reach a contrary conclusion.
Rather than standing for the proposition that the United States's
authority to act outside its territory is necessarily a function of an-
other state's acquiescence, Barr concluded that international law
does not serve as a bar to the United States's sovereign capacity to
act.277 While Schooner Exchange established that customary inter-
national law is a part of U.S. law,2 78 Barr argued that the United
States has the authority to displace that law within its own bounda-
ries. 7' Barr further relied on Brown v. United States,8 ' another
case arising out of the war of 1812, for the proposition that interna-
tional law is a "guide which the sovereign follows or abandons at his
will." '281 Both cases involved foreign vessels in U.S. waters, however,
and thus did not resolve the question of the sovereign's ability to act
273. Downing, supra note 266, at 574.
274. United States v. Yunis, 924 F.2d 1086 (D.C. Cir. 1991). The jurisdictional premise of the
Yunis decision is discussed supra at notes 93-99 and accompanying text. Yunis was suspected of
being the leader of a group of terrorists who had hijacked and destroyed a Jordanian airliner in
Lebanon in 1985. Yunis, 924 F.2d at 1089. After a two-year investigation, FBI agents lured Yunis
with promises of a drug deal to a yacht in the Mediterranean Sea. Id. Once the yacht was in
international waters, the FBI arrested Yunis and transported him via U.S. Navy ships and aircraft
to the United States for trial. Id. Relying on United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir.
1974), Yunis argued that the district court should have divested itself of jurisdiction based on the
government's "outrageous" conduct in apprehending him. The D.C. Circuit, reading Toscanino as
a narrow exception to Ker-Frisbie, examined the FBI's conduct in luring the defendant onto the
yacht and the defendant's subsequent incarceration awaiting arraignment and found no "inten-
tional, outrageous" conduct which would require the court to divest itself of jurisdiction. Id. at
1092-93; see also supra notes 239-61 and accompanying text (discussing the Toscanino case in
light of Ker-Frisbie).
275. U.S. CoNST. art. I1, § 3.
276. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
277. Pregent, supra note 266, at 79.
278. Schooner Exchange, I l U.S. (7 Cranch) at 137.
279. Id. at 146 ("Without doubt, the sovereign of the place is capable of destroying this impli-
cation [of jurisdiction only under international law].").
280. 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110 (1814).
281. Id. at 128.
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outside its territorial jurisdiction.
To establish the executive authority needed to displace customary
282international law, Barr cited The Paquete Habana, a case that
involved the seizure of fishing vessels by the U.S. Navy during the
Spanish-American War.2 83 There the Court had held that the
seizure violated customary international law and ordered the return
of the vessels.284 Barr seized on the following language in Paquete
Habana to establish a place for customary international law within
the hierarchy of U.S. laws:
International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and adminis-
tered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction. . . .For this pur-
pose, where there is no treaty, and no controlling executive or legislative act
or judicial decisions, resort must be had to the customs and usages of civi-
lized nations .... 285
To further bolster his position, Barr relied on Garcia-Mir v.
Meese, 28 a case involving a challenge by Mariel refugees to their
"prolonged arbitrary detention" under customary international law.
The Eleventh Circuit never reached the merits of the case, however,
instead relying on the above dicta in Paquete Habana to hold that
the Executive had authority to displace customary international
law. 287 Thus, Barr concluded, the Executive has the authority to dis-
place such law, at least domestically.28 8 Assuming that Garcia-Mir
stands for the proposition that the Executive may displace custom-
ary international law domestically, there is nevertheless no case law
to support Barr's contention that the Executive's authority extends
beyond U.S. territory. 289
Barr next turned to the constitutional requirement that the Presi-
dent ensure that the "laws be faithfully executed 2 9 0 to support his
view that the President has unilateral authority to displace interna-
tional law. This requirement alone, Barr argued, is enough to grant
the Executive the power to authorize extraterritorial arrests by
agents of the executive branch.291 Barr concluded that even though
282. 175 U.S. 677 (1899).
283. Id.
284. Id. at 714.
285. Id. at 700.
286. 788 F.2d 1446 (11 th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 889 (1986).
287. Id. at 1455.
288. Pregent, supra note 266, at 82-83.
289. Id. at 84.
290. U.S. CONST. art. I1, § 3.
291. Pregent, supra note 266, at 85.
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seizure of a suspect in violation of the domestic law of the asylum
state violates customary international law, both the legislative and
executive branches nonetheless have the constitutional authority to
depart from international law. 92
The policy approach that the 1989 Barr memorandum attempted
to justify has been roundly criticized as "illegal, incoherent, and
likely to backfire upon its drafters, ' 293 unnecessary, 294 and "politi-
cally risky. ' 290 Law enforcement officials preferred to view the Barr
memorandum as a reinterpretation of the authority they already
had rather than as a fundamental shift in policy.2 96 Irrespective of
how the opinion might be characterized, there can be but little
doubt that the 1989 memorandum was a response to frustration
with the increase in international crime and the perceived difficulties
in prosecuting foreign criminals whose crimes affected U.S. national
interests. 97
Perhaps no set of incidents more clearly exposed the frustrations
of United States law enforcement officials - and their consequent
willingness to conduct extraordinary apprehensions - than the tor-
ture and murder of DEA agent Enrique "Kiki" Camarena-Salazar
and the resulting investigation.
2. The Camarena Investigation
DEA Agent Enrique "Kiki" Camarena-Salazar ("Camarena")
had been investigating a multi-million-dollar drug-smuggling syndi-
cate in the state of Jalisco, Mexico. By late 1984, Camarena's inves-
tigation had reached Rafael Caro-Quintero, the leader of the
Guadalajaro Cartel.298 On February 7, 1985, members of the drug
smuggling operation kidnapped Camarena from in front of the U.S.
Consulate in Guadalajara, Mexico, as he left to meet his wife for
lunch.299 Two days later, Caro-Quintero, already suspected in the
abduction, apparently bribed a Mexican Federal Judicial Police
292. Id. at 78.
293. Abramovsky, Abductions, supra note 197, at 152.
294. See Pregent, supra note 266, at 79 (questioning whether domestic legal authority to vio-
late international law is required to serve the extraterritorial law enforcement needs of the United
States).
295. Sofaer, supra note 192, at 110.
296. Downing, supra note 266, at 575.
297. See id. at 575-76 (suggesting rationales for the new policy).
298. Abramovsky, Abductions, supra note 198, at 160.
299. ELAINE SHANNON, DESPERADOS: LATIN DRUG LORDS, U.S. LAWMEN, AND THE WAR
AMERICA CAN'T WIN 9-10 (1988).
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("MFJP") official and escaped via the Guadalajara airport."' 0
On March 5, 1985, Mexican officials discovered the bodies of
Camarena and a Mexican pilot who had worked with him, with
their hands and feet tightly bound, clad only in their underwear, on
the side of a country road in Mexico."0 ' An autopsy revealed that
Camarena had been brutally beaten and had suffered multiple skull
and jaw fractures.30 2 Someone had driven a blunt instrument, such
as a crow bar or tire iron, into agent Camarena's skull.303 His rec-
tum had also been violated by some foreign object, possibly a
stick.304
Camarena's abduction, torture, interrogation, and murder led to
an intensive30 5 five-year investigation that implicated not only
known drug smugglers, but also uncovered strong circumstantial ev-
idence of official corruption and complicity within the Mexican gov-
ernment.306 The DEA's frustration with the Mexican government's
300. See id. at 15-16; Abramovsky, Abductions, supra note 198, at 161 n.42 (both citing the
affidavit of Special Agent Salvador Leyva, filed October 22, 1987, in United States v. Caro-Quin-
tero, 745 F. Supp. 599 (C.D. Cal. 1990)).
301. SHANNON, supra note 299, at 226.
302. Id. at 228.
303. Id.
304. Id. at 226.
305. DEA agent Jaime Kuykendall, Camarena's partner in the Guadalajara DEA office, noted
that "[tihe war on drugs began on February 7, 1985. Nobody did anything until Kiki Camarena
-was gone, and a lot of people just wouldn't let him disappear into the mist." Id. at 453. Professor
Abramovsky, citing the extensive media coverage and the eventual television movie made about
Camarena's death, notes that Camarena's status has been raised to a level near martyrdom.
Abramovsky, Abductions, supra note 198, at 160-61 n.41; see also Ronald J. Ostrow, DEA Direc-
tor Vows to Keep Investigating in Carnarena Case, L.A. TIMEs, Aug. 29, 1990, at A3. Ostrow
quoted newly-appointed DEA director William Bonner:
I am committed to continuing the Camarena murder investigation for as long as it
takes and for as long as there is any prospect . . . to bring justice to anyone involved
in the kidnapping, torture and murder of agent Camarena. . . . The Mexican govern-
ment essentially had closed their investigation. We have not closed our investigation.
There is no statute of limitations on the murder of a federal agent, a DEA agent,
under U.S. law.
Id.
306. See generally SHANNON, supra note 299, at 282-96. Shannon details the involvement of
the Mexican Federal Judicial Police ("MFJP") in concealing the existence of audio tapes that
Camarena's captors made of his interrogation, some of which indicated the involvement of Mexi-
can authorities. Id. Shannon also notes that a telephone call was made from the Guadalajara
airport to a "private line" in the office of MFJP Director Manuel Ibarra on the day that defend-
ant Caro-Quintero bribed his way out of the airport. Id. at 298. Caro-Quintero's involvement and
deportation from Costa Rica to Mexico is discussed infra at notes 308-17 and accompanying text;
see also Ostrow, supra note 305, at A3 (quoting DEA Director Bonner as questioning the Mexi-
can government's willingness to investigate Camarena's murder); Henry Weinstein, U.S. Vows
Pursuit of More Canarena Suspects in Mexico, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 10, 1990, at A3 (noting that
the DEA sought Ibarra-Herrera, former head of the MFJP, and Manuel Aldana-lbarra, head of
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inability - or lack of effort - to mount an effective investigation
into the murder 307 led the agency to use extraordinary means of ap-
prehension to bring three of the foreign suspects before U.S. courts.
Each instance was progressively more blatant in its disregard for
international law than its predecessors.
a. Caro-Quintero
In April 1985, the DEA located Caro-Quintero in Costa Rica and
persuaded Costa Rican authorities to arrest him. °8 In an early
morning raid, a Costa Rican antiterrorist squad arrested Caro-
Quintero and six of his accomplices."0 The U.S. DEA attach6 in
San Jose convinced the Costa Rican government to deport Caro-
Quintero to Mexico, where a warrant for his arrest was outstand-
ing.310 Mexican authorities arrived the next day and took Caro-
Quintero back to Mexico.311
Caro-Quintero's deportation to Mexico, while not done in strict
Mexico's "equivalent to the DEA," and that the DEA was investigating Mexico City chief of
police Javier Garcia Paniagua).
307. The agency's intense frustration with the Mexican government and its failure to mount an
effective investigation is amply documented in SHANNON, supra note 299; see also Mexico.- A
Sorry Tale of Drugs, Graft and Corruption, 132 CONG. REC. 10,764 (1986) (statement of Sen.
Hawkins) (decrying Mexican corruption and its lack of effective efforts to combat drug traffick-
ing); Storm Rises Over Camarena: U.S. Wants Harder Line Adopted, WKLY. REP., Mar. 8, 1985,
at 10 (reporting that then-DEA Chief Francis Mullen had charged the Mexican police with delib-
erately allowing a "key suspect" [Caro-Quintero] to slip away).
308. SHANNON, supra note 299, at 247-48.
309. Id. at 250-52. Shannon also notes that the DEA attach6 himself followed closely on the
heels of the Costa Rican antiterrorist squad and participated in the arrest of Caro-Quintero. Id.
This was in violation of the Mansfield Amendment, 22 U.S.C. § 2291(c)(1) (1988), which pro-
vides that no U.S. law enforcement agent "may directly effect an arrest in any foreign country as
part of any foreign police action with respect to narcotics control efforts, notwithstanding any
other provision of law." Id. The Mansfield Amendment was amended in 1986 after Caro-Quin-
tero's arrest to allow U.S. law enforcement officials to assist foreign officers who are effecting an
arrest. Id., amended by Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 2009, 100 Stat. 3207-64 (1986).
The prohibition on participating in arrests overseas frustrated some law enforcement officers. As
Travis Kuykendall, an agent in Mexico from 1972 to 1978, explained:
If you're going to go into a country like Mexico, convince them to go out and eradi-
cate drugs and make arrests, and that country doesn't even recognize the problem,
how are you going to tell five Mexican policemen to go out there and arrest that big
trafficker, he's got thirty armed guards, and I'm going to stay here in the office, and if
you do it, I'll buy you a cup of coffee? It didn't work. The greatest motivator was that
we were willing to go out and risk our own rear ends for our country. The Mexicans
said, You guys are not serious about this. They lost faith in us. They didn't go. They
started lying, and they started taking money.
SHANNON, supra note 299, at 459 n.6.
310. Abramovsky, Abductions, supra note 198, at 161.
311. SHANNON, supra note 299, at 254.
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accordance with an extradition treaty, nonetheless received the ap-
proval of the highest levels of the Costa Rican government.1 2 This
high-level approval, however, did not completely legitimize the pro-
ceedings. 31 ' The Costa Rican government did not prosecute Caro-
Quintero for any violation of its laws, nor did it afford him the bene-
fit of an extradition proceeding.31 Indeed, the Costa Ricans seemed
to rely exclusively on the representations of the United States offi-
cials on the scene. 15 In any event, the cooperation between the
DEA, the Costa Ricans, and the Mexicans loaned an "'aura' of ex-
tradition" to Caro-Quintero's deportation.31 6 At a minimum, his ir-
regular rendition to Mexico did not offend the territorial sovereignty
of Costa Rica.317 The extralegal nature of his deportation to Mexico
did, however, set the stage for the progressively less palatable appre-
hensions to come.
b. Verdugo-Urquidez
The DEA suspected Rene Martin Verdugo-Urquidez, a Mexican
citizen, 18 of being a leader of the Mexican drug smuggling opera-
tion responsible for the abduction and murder of agent
Camarena. 1 9 The DEA did not request Verdugo-Urquidez's extra-
dition. 2 ° Instead, the DEA obtained a warrant for his arrest and
contacted members of the MFJP to arrange for Verdugo-Urquidez's
capture.321 On January 24, 1986, the MFJP - apparently without
authority from their federal government - obliged this request.3 2
The MFJP arrested Verdugo-Urquidez, drove him to the U.S.-
Mexican border at Calexico, California, and pushed him through a
312. Abramovsky, Abductions. supra note 198, at 161.
313. Id.
314. Id. at 161-62.
315. See SHANNON, supra note 299, at 247-54 (describing the DEA attache's efforts to con-
vince the Costa Rican Minister of Public Security that Caro-Quintero was dangerous, that he
ought to be arrested, and that he ought to be deported to Mexico to avert an escape attempt).
316. Abramovsky, Abductions, supra note 198, at 162.
317. Id.
318. Verdugo-Urquidez had been, however, a resident alien in the United States. Id. at 162.
319. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 262 (1990) ["Verdugo r!].
320. While there is a mutual extradition treaty in place between the United States and Mexico,
article 9(1 ) of the treaty relieves Mexico of any obligation to extradite its nationals; indeed, extra-
dition of Mexican citizens is constitutionally prohibited. See supra notes 164-69 and accompany-
ing text (describing the U.S.-Mexico extradition treaty).
321. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d 1214, 1216 (9th Cir. 1988), rev'd, 494 U.S.




hole in the fence into the hands of the United States Border Pa-
trol. 23 While this rendition had the cooperation of the Mexican po-
lice, if not the Mexican government,32" it nevertheless had no
'aura' of extradition. 325
Verdugo-Urquidez's extraordinary apprehension did not come up
on his first appeal,3 26 but he did challenge the personal jurisdiction
of the U.S. district court in a pretrial motion based on the methods
used to secure his presence. 32 7 In denying this motion, the court
noted that:
Though this circuit has yet to address the issue, there is a clear line of Sec-
ond Circuit cases which hold that abduction from another country violates
international law only when the offended state objects to the conduct ...
The court is unaware of any formal objection by the government of Mexico
and thus finds that the issue of the effect of violation of international law on
Verdugo's criminal prosecution is not properly before the court at this
time.328
On a separate appeal, 329 Verdugo-Urquidez argued that his ab-
duction violated the U.S.-Mexico extradition treaty, and that there-
fore the district court was without personal jurisdiction to try
323. See Abramovsky, Abductions, supra note 198, at 162 (explaining Verdugo-Urquidez's
arrest).
324. The State Prosecutor for the state of Baja, Mexico, was substantially less sanguine about
the irregular rendition, resulting in the formal indictment of Verdugo-Urquidez's Mexican abduc-
tors on kidnapping charges. Verdugo 1, 856 F.2d at 1216 n.1; see also supra notes 189-205 and
accompanying text (discussing the potential violation of domestic law inherent in abductions).
325. See Abramovsky, Abductions. supra note 198, at 162 (referring to Caro-Quintero's depor-
tation from Costa Rica to Mexico).
326. Instead, Verdugo-Urquidez moved to suppress evidence that the DEA had obtained in a
post-arrest search of his home in Mexico. The trial court granted the motion, and the Ninth
Circuit affirmed, holding that Fourth Amendment protections apply to noncitizens and that its
restrictions on governmental intrusions apply to the United States when it acts abroad. Verdugo 1,
856 F.2d at 1215-18. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the search of the
defendant's Mexican residence subsequent to his arrest in the United States did not violate the
defendant's Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable search and seizure since Verdugo-
Urquidez, a noncitizen, was not one of "the people" that the Fourth Amendment contemplated
protecting. Verdugo 1, 494 U.S. at 259-60.
327. See Abramovsky, Abductions, supra note 198, at 163 n.55 (citing an unpublished order
denying Verdugo-Urquidez's motion to dismiss pursuant to Toscanino).
328. Id. Professor Abramovsky notes that the Mexican government, which had yet to protest up
to that time, did protest Verdugo-Urquidez's abduction once the motion to dismiss was denied. Id.
The Mexican government did not make the same mistake again. When Dr. Alvarez-Machain was
abducted, the Mexican government protested promptly and vociferously. United States v. Alvarez-
Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188, 2191 (1992).
329. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 939 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1991), vacated and re-
manded, 112 S. Ct. 2986 (1992) ["Verdugo 11"].
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him. 3 ° In opposition, the U.S. argued that a forcible abduction does
not normally divest a court of personal jurisdiction, even where
there is an extradition treaty in place and the offended state regis-
ters a protest.33' Further, the government argued that the treaty did
not explicitly prohibit kidnapping, and that individuals did not have
standing to raise treaty violations.3 32
The Ninth Circuit distinguished Ker,333 noting that the kidnap-
ping in Ker had not involved an officially-sanctioned kidnapping, nor
had the government of Peru protested Ker's abduction. 34 Turning
to the extradition treaty, the court found that extradition treaties
imposed mutual obligations, and that the government's contention
that it could disregard the treaty at will contravened the underlying
purposes of extradition treaties. 3 5 The court noted that state-spon-
sored kidnapping represents a breach of the asylum state's sover-
eignty and thus violates international law. 338 The court held that,
absent the asylum state's consent, either by expressly agreeing in
advance or by failing to protest, a government-sponsored kidnapping
is a breach of an extradition treaty.3 7
The court rejected the notion that the legality of the abduction
was a political question, concluding that if the court were to hold
that the United States could unilaterally "invade the sovereign terri-
tory of Mexico and kidnap an individual without violating this na-
tion's treaty obligations, it would follow inexorably that no treaty
bar exists to similar acts by foreign governments against citizens of
the United States. ' 38 The court remanded the case, however, for a
trial court determination as to whether the U.S. government was
actually responsible for the abduction.339
330. Id. at 1343.
331. Id. at 1351.
332. Id.
333. Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886).
334. Verdugo I, 939 F.2d at 1345-46.
335. Id. at 1349-50.
336. Id. at 1352.
337. Id.
338. Id. at 1362. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and vacated the Ninth Circuit's deci-
sion, remanding the case to the appellate court for further proceedings consistent with United
States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188 (1992). United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 112 S.
Ct. 2986 (1992).




Again using extralegal methods, United States agents arranged
with the Honduran military for the deportation of Juan Ramon
Matta-Ballesteros, a Honduran national, from Honduras to the Do-
minican Republic, and from there to the United States. 40 Matta-
Ballesteros, an escapee from a U.S. prison camp at the Eglin Air
Force Base in Florida,34' was allegedly a chemist for the Guadala-
jara drug cartel, 342 and had been indicted along with Caro-Quintero
and Alvarez-Machain. 43 On April 5, 1988, Honduran police, alleg-
edly with the help of U.S. agents, arrested Matta-Ballesteros in
front of his home in Tegucigalpa, Honduras, shocked him with an
electronic "stun-gun," bundled him into a truck, and took him to an
airfield for a flight out of the country. 4 He was first flown to the
Dominican Republic, where he was placed on a plane bound for the
United States.345 On arrival in the United States, he was arrested
and transferred to the federal penitentiary at Marion, Illinois. 3"
Matta-Ballesteros claimed that he had been beaten and shocked
with an electrical device during the course of his rendition to the
U.S., and offered his prison medical examination report in support
of this contention. 47 On a writ of habeas corpus, the district court
reached the issues of treaty law and due process.348 The court held
that absent a protest from the Honduran government, Matta-Balles-
teros was without standing to assert a violation of the extradition
treaty between the United States and Honduras. 34 9 Further, the
court held that it was without jurisdiction to rule on violations of the
Honduran constitution asserted by Matta-Ballesteros.350
The court refused to apply the Toscanino exception to the Ker-
340. United States v. Matta-Ballesteros, 700 F. Supp. 528, 529 (N.D. Fla. 1988).
341. Id.
342. SHANNON, supra note 299, at 269.
343. See United States v. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. 599, 600 (C.D. Cal. 1990) (discussing
the indictments of Caro-Quintero and Alvarez-Machain).
344. Matta-Ballesteros ex rel. Stolar v. Henman, 697 F. Supp. 1040, 1041-42 (S.D. Ill. 1988).
345. Matta-Ballesteros, 700 F. Supp. at 529.
346. Id.
347. Matta-Ballesteros, 697 F. Supp. at 1042. The medical evidence indicated that Matta-
Ballesteros had abrasions of the neck, a depigmented and scaled area on his penis, linear abrasions
on his forearms, a cut on his foot, and "[miultiple erythematous spots of about 3-5 mm" on his
back. Id.
348. Id. at 1043.
349. Id. at 1044.
350. Id.
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Frisbie doctrine 51 despite the uncontroverted evidence of torture.3 52
In this respect, the court held that even if the Seventh Circuit were
to apply the Toscanino exception, "the Court [found] that, as a
matter of law, the allegations ...d[id] not rise to the threshold
standard of Toscanino. The allegations of torture d[id] not meet the
required level of outrageousness. ' ' 353 This holding seems to bear out
Professor Abraham Abramovsky's contention that the Toscanino ex-
ception is, indeed, meaningless. 5 4
The extralegal nature of the Caro-Quintero, Verdugo-Urquidez,
and Matta-Ballesteros cases set the tone for the official actions
taken in the next case of extraordinary apprehension in the




On January 30, 1985, as a result of leads developed during the
Camarena murder investigation,355 the United States indicted Dr.
Humberto Alvarez-Machain, a Guadalajara gynecologist, for his
participation in the torture and murder of Agent Enrique
Camarena. 356 Allegedly, Dr. Alvarez-Machain's role in the torture
was to prolong Camarena's life so that he could be further interro-
gated and tortured.5 7
In December of 1989, DEA agents began negotiations through a
paid informant with representatives of the MFJP for the informal
surrender of Dr. Alvarez-Machain.358 In return for Dr. Alvarez-
351. See supra notes 239-61 and accompanying text (discussing the Toscanino "exception" to
the Ker-Frisbie rule).
352. Matta-Ballesteros, 697 F. Supp. at 1046-47.
353. Id. at 1046.
354. Abramovsky, Abductions, supra note 198, at 160; see supra notes 260-61 and accompany-
ing text (noting that Toscanino's exception is meaningless in practice).
355. See supra notes 298-354 and accompanying text (discussing the Camarena investigation).
356. United States v. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. 599, 602 (C.D. Cal. 1990), aff'd sub noma.
United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 946 F.2d 1466 (9th Cir. 1991) (per curiam), rev'd, 112 S. Ct.
2188 (1992).
357. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2190. Alvarez-Machain was charged in a sixth supersed-
ing indictment with conspiracy to commit violent acts and violent acts in furtherance of an enter-
prise engaged in racketeering activity under 18 U.S.C. § 1959 (1988), conspiracy to kidnap a
federal agent under 18 U.S.C. § 1201(c), kidnapping of a federal agent under 18 U.S.C.
§ 1201(a)(5), felony-murder under 18 U.S.C. §§ llII(a), 1114, and accessory after the fact
under 18 U.S.C. § 3. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. at 601 n.1
358. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. at 602.
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Machain, the Mexicans wanted the reciprocal return of a Mexican
fugitive then at large in the United States. a 9 The MFJP representa-
tives told the DEA that, while the informal rendition had the full
support of the Mexican attorney general, they preferred to keep the
arrangements secret to avoid public protest.360
In January of 1990, the informant, Antonio Garate-Bustamonte,
informed the DEA that, in addition to the return of the Mexican
fugitive, the MFJP wanted $50,000 for expenses. 361 The DEA
balked at this request, and further negotiations proved fruitless.36 2
Garate-Bustamonte approached the DEA agents again in March of
1990 and informed them that he and his associates could deliver Dr.
Alvarez-Machain at that time; the DEA agents agreed to pay them
$20,000 plus expenses for their services.36 3
On April 2, 1990, five or six armed men burst into Dr. Alvarez-
Machain's Guadalajara medical office, abducted Dr. Alvarez-
Machain, and took him by car to an airport in northern Mexico. 64
From there, Dr. Alvarez-Machain was flown to El Paso, Texas,
where DEA agents were waiting to arrest him.365 After a brief med-
ical examination in El Paso, the DEA flew Dr. Alvarez-Machain to
San Diego, California, to stand trial. 366 The DEA paid Garate-Bus-
tamonte and his associates a reward of $20,000 for their services, as
well as $6,000 per week to maintain the abductors and their families
in the United States.36 7
The Mexican government quickly protested the abduction to the
U.S. Department of State, demanding Dr. Alvarez-Machain's im-
mediate return to Mexico." 8' The Mexicans further charged Dr. Al-
varez-Machain's abductors, as well as the DEA agent in charge of
the investigation, with kidnapping, and requested their return to









367. Id. at 603-04. There is no indication of the planned duration of this arrangement.
368. Id. at 604.
369. Id.
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B. The District Court's Decision
Dr. Alvarez-Machain filed a motion in district court to dismiss
the indictment, arguing that the court lacked in personam jurisdic-
tion because U.S. agents had forcibly abducted him from Mexico in
violation of his due process rights.370 In addition, he argued that the
abduction violated the extradition treaty between the United States
and Mexico.371
Given the precedential weight of Ker-Frisbie,3 72 Judge Edward
Rafeedie rejected Alvarez-Machain's due process claim, reaffirming
the Ker holding that forcible abduction does not deprive the court of
the authority to try a defendant on criminal charges.37 The court
agreed, however, that the United States's unilateral abduction had
violated the U.S.-Mexico extradition treaty. 74 Judge Rafeedie held
that a party to a mutual extradition treaty violates the treaty when
it abrogates to itself the right to abduct a fugitive from the territory
of the second state when that state protests the abduction. 75
In reaching that conclusion, the court held first that the diplo-
matic notes that the Mexican government had presented to the U.S.
State Department constituted an official protest by the offended sov-
ereign;37 16 this protest was sufficient to grant Alvarez-Machain deriv-
ative standing to invoke Mexico's rights under the treaty. 77 Second,
the court held that the United States was indeed responsible for the
kidnapping, since the abductors were paid agents of the United
States, and since the plan to abduct Dr. Alvarez-Machain had been
induced by, and approved at, the highest levels of the DEA.a78 The
determination of state responsibility for a unilateral abduction, cou-
pled with an official protest from the offended sovereign, constituted
a violation of the extradition treaty. 7
The court rejected the government's argument that, since there
had never been any formal extradition proceedings against Alvarez-
370. Id. at 601.
371. Id.
372. See supra notes 206-61 and accompanying text (discussing the Ker-Frisbie doctrine and
its exceptions).
373. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. at 604-06.
374. Id. at 609.
375. Id.
376. Id. at 608.
377. Id. at 608-09.




Machain, there was no violation of the treaty."' The court held that
while an extradition treaty does not represent the exclusive means
by which one state might render criminal defendants to another, ex-
tradition treaties do limit the scope of permissible state conduct.38'
The court, analogizing to United States v. Rauscher, 3 2 reasoned
that:
The government's contention in the present case that a state violates an ex-
tradition treaty when it prosecutes for a crime other than that for which the
individual was extradited (the doctrine of specialty), but not when a state
unilaterally flouts the procedures of the extradition treaty altogether and
abducts an individual for prosecution on whatever crimes it chooses, is
absurd. 3
The district court, in distinguishing the case from Ker, focused on
the issue of the United States's responsibility for the action." 4 In
Ker, the court reasoned, the kidnapping agent had acted on his own,
and the abduction therefore could not have been construed as a
state action.38 5 Having decided that the United States violated the
extradition treaty based on the U.S.-sponsored abduction, and that
Dr. Alvarez-Machain had standing to claim those rights derived
from the Mexican government's protest, there remained only the
question of remedy.
The court held that the proper remedy for a violation of interna-
tional law is, to the extent possible, a return to the status quo
ante."'8 Thus, the district court ordered Dr. Alvarez-Machain's im-
mediate repatriation to Mexico.38 7
C. The Ninth Circuit's Opinion
The government appealed the district court's order and the Ninth
Circuit, relying on its decision in United States v. Verdugo-Ur-
quidez,3 8 affirmed. 8  The Ninth Circuit held that the facts of the
380. Id.
381. Id. at 609-10.
382. 119 U.S. 407 (1886); see supra notes 226-30 and accompanying text (discussing the deci-
sion in Rauscher).
383. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. at 610.
384. Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886); see supra notes 206-61 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing Ker and its progeny).
385. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. at 611.
386. Id. at 614 (citing I RESTATEMENT (THIRD). supra note 26, § 901 and notes).
387. Id.
388. 939 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1991), vacated and remanded, 112 S. Ct. 2986 (1992).
389. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 946 F.2d 1466 (9th Cir. 1991) (per curiam), rev'd,
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Alvarez-Machain case were directly on point with those of Verdugo-
Urquidez, and thus required repatriation of Alvarez-Machain. 9 ° It
found that the trial court had explicitly addressed the circuit's con-
cerns of government responsibility and official Mexican protest. 391
The Ninth Circuit, therefore, ordered that the indictment be dis-
missed and that Dr. Alvarez-Machain be repatriated to Mexico. 92
The Supreme Court, however, granted certiorari.93
D. The Majority Opinion
As framed by the Supreme Court, the issue on appeal was
whether a criminal defendant, abducted by the United States from
a nation with which the United States has an extradition treaty,
acquires a defense to the jurisdiction of U.S. courts.3 9 The Court,
in an opinion by Chief Justice William Rehnquist,396 held that the
extradition treaty did not explicitly forbid one state's unilateral ab-
duction of a fugitive from the other's territory, 96 and that neither
the language nor the history of the treaty supported an implied pro-
hibition on acquiring jurisdiction outside its terms. 97
Alvarez-Machain argued that his prosecution, like that in Rau-
scher, violated the implied terms of an extradition treaty.3 98 The
United States argued that Rauscher stood as an exception to the
Ker line of cases, and therefore applied only when one state invoked
the extradition treaty.399 Thus, the central inquiry was whether Dr.
Alvarez-Machain's kidnapping violated the terms of the extradition
treaty. If the kidnapping did not, the Court found, then it could
merely apply the Ker holding and "need not inquire as to how [Al-
varez-Machain] came before it."'40
112 S. Ct. 2188 (1992).
390. Id. at 1467.
391. Id. at 1466.
392. Id. at 1467.
393. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188 (1992).
394. Id. at 2190.
395. The majority consisted of the Chief Justice and Justices Byron White, Antonin Scalia,
Anthony Kennedy, David Souter, and Clarence Thomas, while Justice John Paul Stevens dis-
sented. See infra notes 427-62 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Stevens's dissent).
396. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2193.
397. Id. at 2195-96.





1. Treaty Language and History
In interpreting the extradition treaty, the Court first looked to the
terms of the document itself and found that it was devoid of express
provisions outlining the parties' mutual obligation to refrain from
abducting each other's nationals. 0 1 The Court rejected Alvarez-
Machain's argument that Article 22 (1) of the treaty, which states
that the extradition treaty "shall apply" to all of the enumerated
offenses "committed before and after this Treaty enters into
force,"'40 2 clearly implies that the treaty is the only way to prosecute
or extradite fugitives between the two states.40 The Court reasoned
that in light of additional language in Article 22, which provides
that extraditions already in process at the time of the signing would
be handled according to the terms of the previous treaty, it was
more "natural" to conclude that Article 22 simply provides assur-
ance that the treaty will apply to extraditions requested after the
treaty came into force. 4
Similarly, the Court rejected Dr. Alvarez-Machain's argument
that Article 9 of the treaty,40 5 which allows either party to refuse to
extradite its nationals and invokes a duty to prosecute or extradite,
describes the terms of the agreement between the states. Alvarez-
Machain argued that, since Mexico refused to extradite its nation-
als, if the United States wants a Mexican national it must first
make an extradition request and then allow Mexico to prosecute the
offender.4 06 He then argued that this limitation on the respective
401. Id.
402. See Extradition Treaty, May 4, 1978, U.S.-Mex., 31 U.S.T. 5061, 5061 art. 2 (enumerat-
ing the list of extraditable offenses which includes kidnapping and murder, two of the offenses
with which Dr. Alvarez-Machain was charged).
403. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2194.
404. Id. at 2193 n.10.
405. Extradition Treaty, 31 U.S.T at 5065. See supra note '186 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the Article 9 proscriptions against extraditing nationals and the duty to prosecute or
extradite).
406. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2193-94. The exchange between Justice Scalia and Mr.
Hoffman, attorney for Dr. Alvarez-Machain, is illustrative of the Court's strict textualist bent:
SCALIA: You repeatedly refer to "limitations" in the treaty and in Article 9. But the
treaty simply does not contain any such limitations.
HOFFMAN: Mexico had said all along that it would never extradite Mexican nationals
to foreign countries. Article 9 supplied a means for action to be taken if Mexican
nationals were wanted for a crime by the United States - the United States can
make an extradition request, and Mexico may extradite or try the suspect herself.
SCALIA: It seems to me that you're relying not on the treaty but on general principles
of international law.
HOFFMAN: I'm saying that the United States' conduct here violated the clear intent of
1994]
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states' options preserved the states' rights with respect to where its
citizens would be tried: in either foreign or domestic courts. Further,
Dr. Alvarez-Machain argued that the treaty's processes and restric-
tions on the duty to extradite do not make sense if either party is
free to eschew extradition altogether in favor of unilateral abduc-
tion.401 The Court held that Article 9 contains no such implied re-
striction on the respective states to use the treaty as the sole means
for acquiring custody over the other country's nationals. 08 Reason-
ing that since a state is not under an obligation to surrender its na-
tionals absent a treaty, the treaty itself merely establishes proce-
dures the states are obligated to follow when the treaty is
invoked.40 9 It does not imply that the treaty is the exclusive means
of acquiring jurisdiction over the respective parties' nationals.4 10
To bolster its conclusion that the U.S.-Mexico extradition treaty
does not require the state parties to refrain from abduction, the
Court examined the history and practices of both the United States
and Mexico under the treaty.41' The Court noted that the Mexican
government had been aware of the Ker doctrine as early as 1906,
and had not added any language to the treaty to limit its effect. 12
Thus, the Court held that neither the language nor the history of
the treaty evinced a prohibition against unilateral abduction in dis-
regard of the treaty.41 3
2. Treaty Interpretation
Having concluded that the treaty itself does not expressly forbid
actions outside its terms, the Court then asked whether such a pro-
scription could be implied.4 4 Dr. Alvarez-Machain contended that
the treaty.
SCALIA: Intent, not language.
HOFFMAN: Yes.
Arguments Heard on Forcible Abduction of Foreign National for Criminal Prosecution; Remedy,
U.S.L.W. (daily ed.), Apr. 14, 1992, available in LEXIS. Genfed Library, USLWD file [hereinaf-
ter Arguments Heard].
407. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2194.
408. Id.
409. Id.
410. Id. at 2195.
411. Id. at 2194-95.
412. Id. n.13 (citing Harvard Research, supra note 26, art. 16 as an example of delimiting
language available to dampen the effect of Ker).
413. Id. at 2195.
414. Id. (quoting Valentine v. United States ex rel. Neidecker, 299 U.S. 5, 17 (1936)
("Strictly, the question is not whether there had been a uniform practical construction denying the
[Vol. 43:449
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international abductions are so clearly violative of customary inter-
national law as to obviate the need to include a clause restricting
them in an extradition treaty.4 15 Alvarez-Machain cited the U.N.
Charter416 and the Charter of the Organization of American
States4 17 as evidence of the widespread acceptance of the principle
that states may not violate the territorial integrity of other states.
41 8
The Court was puzzled by the requirement that the "offended"
state must protest in order to trigger individual standing on the part
of a defendant. 1 9 The Court found that if extradition treaties are
self-executing then they are enforceable in federal courts irrespec-
tive of a foreign state's objections. 2 0 Thus, the Court determined
that in Rauscher, Britain had argued in other cases that the doc-
trine of specialty was inherent in extradition treaties, but that Brit-
ain's protest of Rauscher's prosecution for crimes other than those
for which he was extradited was irrelevant to the issue; the Court
implied specialty from the current practice of nations with respect
to extradition treaties.421 The Court here found that Alvarez-
Machain was attempting to imply a term into an extradition treaty
from the practice of nations generally.422 Thus, the Court held, with
respect to the prohibition on the extraterritorial use of the police
power: "There are many actions which could be taken by a nation
that would violate this principle, including waging war, but it cannot
seriously be contended [that] an invasion of the United States by
Mexico would violate the terms of the extradition treaty between
the two nations. ' 423 Concluding that the treaty forbids acquiring the
presence of the defendant outside its terms required an "inferential
leap, with only the most general of international law principles to
power, but whether the power had been so clearly recognized that the grant should be implied.")).
415. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2195.
416. U.N. CHARTER art. 2.
417. CHARTER OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES (O.A.S.) art. 1.
418. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2195. While Alvarez-Machain did not rely on these in-
struments as a basis for his claim, the United States conceded that it had violated both the U.N.
and O.A.S. Charters. See Arguments Heard, supra note 406 (noting that while the Solicitor Gen-
eral conceded that the U.S; action violated the U.N. and O.A.S. Charters in response to question-
ing from Justice Souter, the violation was indirect and a matter for the executive branches of the
respective governments).
419. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2195.
420. Id.
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support it." 24
Conceding that the abduction might indeed have been "shock-
ing," and that it might have also been violative of international law,
the Court held that it nonetheless did not violate the mutual extra-
dition treaty between the United States and Mexico.425 Having con-
cluded that the United States had not violated the treaty, the Court
held that Ker was "fully applicable" to Dr. Alvarez-Machain and
that he could, therefore, be tried in the United States.426
E. The Dissent
Characterizing the decision as "monstrous," '427 Justice John Paul
Stevens42 attacked the majority's holding both as a matter of treaty
interpretation429 and as a misreading of precedent. 3 Like the ma-
jority, the dissent found the central issue to be whether the United
States's unilateral action violated the treaty; 31 but unlike the ma-
jority, the dissent viewed the issue of state responsibility as central
to the inquiry.432
1. Treaty Interpretation
Justice Stevens began his analysis of the U.S.-Mexico extradition
treaty by noting that its purpose is to assist the United States and
Mexico "to cooperate more closely in the fight against crime and, to
this end, to mutually render better assistance in matters of extradi-
tion."4 3 Given that treaties are to be interpreted to give the words a
meaning consistent with the parties' expectations, Justice Stevens
found it "difficult to see how an interpretation that encourages uni-
lateral action could foster cooperation and mutual assistance - the
424. Id.
425. Id. at 2196-97.
426. Id. at 2197.
427. Id. at 2206 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see id. at 2201-02, quoting The Apollon, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) 362, 370-71 (1824) ("It would be monstrous to suppose that our revenue officers were
authorized to enter into foreign ports and territories, [to seize] vessels which had offended against
our laws. It cannot be presumed that Congress would voluntarily justify such a clear violation of
the laws of nations.").
428. Justices Harry Blackmun and Sandra Day O'Connor joined Justice Stevens's dissent.
429. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S.Ct. at 2198-2200 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
430. Id. at 2200-03 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
431. Id. at 2197, (Stevens, J., dissenting).
432. Id.
433. Id. at 2198 (Stevens, J., dissenting), quoting Extradition Treaty, May 4, 1978, U.S.-Mex.,
31 U.S.T. at 5061, 5061.
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stated goals of the Treaty."""4 Futher, the dissent reasoned, the
document itself is comprehensive, addressing issues of concern to the
criminal processes of both signatories and providing protections for
their respective interests. 35
An interpretation that the treaty is not exclusive, and that it al-
lows both sides to conduct unilateral abductions from the other's
territory would render the specific provisions of the treaty "little
more than verbiage. '43  Thus, for example, either party could avoid
the treaty's reservation against political offenses, or the states' pre-
rogative to refuse extradition where the accused could face the
death penalty in the requesting nation, merely by kidnapping the
accused without resort to the treaty. 3
The dissent reasoned that the parties' failure to explicitly promise
not to kidnap each other's citizens hardly justified a conclusion that
kidnapping was, therefore, permissible:
Relying on that omission, the Court, in effect, concludes that the Treaty
merely creates an optional method of obtaining jurisdiction over alleged of-
fenders, and that the parties silently reserved the right to resort to self-help
whenever they deem force more expeditious than legal process. If the United
States, for example, thought it more expedient to torture or simply to exe-
cute a person rather than to attempt extradition, these options would be
equally available because they, too, were not explicitly prohibited by the
Treaty."3 8
Put more bluntly, the dissent argued that the majority had, in
effect, written a new provision into Article 9 of the treaty: "Not-
withstanding paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article, either Contracting
Party can, without the consent of the other, abduct nationals from
the territory of one Party to be tried in the territory of the other."4 3 9
As there was nothing in the negotiating history, ratification process,
or subsequent dealings between the states to suggest a contrary un-
derstanding,44 ° the dissent reasoned that the "manifest scope and
434. .1d. at 2191 n.4.
435. See id. at 2198 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting treaty reservations against extradition for
political or military offenses (Art. 5), where the accused has already been tried in one country
(Art. 6), when the statute of limitations for the offense has expired (Art. 7), and discretionary
extradition if the accused would face the death penalty in the requesting state (Art. 8)).
436. Id.
437. Id.
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object of the treaty itself'4 41 clearly implied a mutual undertaking
between the parties to observe their respective territorial integri-
ties.4 4' 2 The dissent reasoned that implying such a term into the ex-
tradition treaty was supported by the precedent the Court articu-
lated in Rauscher as well as by the weight of international law. 4 3
2. Implying Terms to the Treaty
Having concluded that the treaty represents a comprehensive
treatment of the parties' intent with respect to cooperation in ex-
changing fugitives, Justice Stevens argued that the Court's own pre-
cedent supported an implication of exclusivity into the terms of the
treaty. In Rauscher, the dissent argued, the Court was faced with a
treaty substantially less comprehensive than the treaty at issue 44
and had implied a term requiring that a state prosecute a fugitive
only for the crime for which he or she had been extradited, despite
the lack of any express language in the treaty.44 5 The Rauscher
Court had concluded that the "fair purpose of the treaty" required
implication of the term, 4 6 reasoning that it did not make sense for
the treaty to supply specific crimes for which extradition could be
had, only to allow the accused to be extradited to the other country
"free from all the positive requirements and just implications of the
treaty under which the transfer of his person takes place."447 Simi-
larly, the Rauscher Court rejected the argument that the treaty rep-
resented merely a procedural device as contrary to "the manifest
scope and object of the treaty itself."448 Thus, the dissent concluded,
441. Id. at 2199 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407,
422 (1886)).
442. Id.
443. Id. at 2200-03 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407 (1886)).
444. The Treaty to Settle and Define Boundaries between the Territories of the United States
and the Possessions of Her Britannic Majesty in North America; for the Final Suppression of the
African Slave Trade; and for the Giving Up of Criminals, Fugitives from Justice, in Certain
Cases, Aug. 9, 1842, U.S.-U.K., 8 Stat. 576 [hereinafter 1842 Treaty], delineated the border
between the U.S. and Canada, provided for suppression of the African slave trade, and contained
one paragraph respecting mutual extradition between the parties. The mutual extradition provi-
sion listed seven specific crimes for which a fugitive could be extradited, and provided for judicial
review and evidentiary requirements. See Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2200 n.16 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (setting out the extradition provisions of the 1842 Treaty in full).
445. See Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2200-03 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Rauscher,
119 U.S. 407 (1886)).
446. Id. at 2200 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Rauscher, 119 U.S. at 423).
447. Id. (quoting Rauscher, 119 U.S. at 421).
448. Id. at 2201 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Rauscher, 119 U.S. at 422).
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an extradition treaty sufficed to protect a defendant from prosecu-
tion despite the absence of express limitations on the parties' power
to do so." 9
Furthermore, the dissent noted that the weight of precedent re-
specting specialty in the context of extradition proceedings was far
less compelling than "the consensus of international opinion that
condemns one Nation's violation of the territorial integrity of a
friendly neighbor." 50 That one party to an extradition treaty might
believe itself vested with a secret right to violate the territorial in-
tegrity of the other party to abduct its citizens was, Justice Stevens
observed, "shocking."451
3. State Responsibility
The dissent also argued that the majority, in failing to make a
distinction between a private abduction and one explicitly author-
ized by the Executive Branch, had mischaracterized the issue
presented by the case.452 Though a private action could not violate a
treaty between two sovereigns, a state-sponsored violation of another
state's territorial integrity clearly did.45 By framing the issue as
"whether a criminal defendant, abducted to the United States from
a nation with which it has an extradition treaty, thereby acquires a
defense to the jurisdiction of this country's courts, ' 454 the dissent
argued that the majority merely rephrased the question already an-
swered in Ker.455 According to the dissent, the issue in Kerr was
distinct from the question presented here.456
The dissent noted that the majority had made this distinction in
prior cases to preclude U.S. adjudication in cases of wrongful
seizure, and that the distinction was crucial to resolving the case.
Indeed, the distinction between private and state action had been a




452. Id. at 2203 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
453. Id.
454. Id. at 2190.




4. Consideration of the Decision's Impact
Finally, Justice Stevens questioned the impact that the majority's
holding would have on courts throughout the world.457 Noting that
although the United States's interest in prosecuting a person ac-
cused of the brutal murder of one of its agents was compelling, the
facts of the case did not entitle the Court to "disregard[] the Rule
of Law [it had] a duty to uphold."45 8 The dissent observed that the
desire for vengeance, to quote Justice Holmes, "exerts 'a kind of
hydraulic pressure . . . before which even well settled principles of
law will bend.' "-59 It is at moments such as these, the dissent ar-
gued, that the Court must be most mindful of its duty to "render
judgment evenly and dispassionately according to law."' 460 Noting
that the way in which the Court performs that duty in a volatile
case sets an example for other courts throughout the world, 46' the
dissent concluded that foreign tribunals were apt to be "deeply dis-
turbed" by the majority's decision.462
III. ANALYSIS
In United States v. Alvarez-Machain,46 3 the Supreme Court held
that, absent an express treaty provision to the contrary, abduction of
a foreign citizen in a foreign country by agents of the United States
does not deprive a U.S. court of jurisdiction over the defendant.464
To arrive at this conclusion, the Court found that the U.S. action in
abducting Dr. Alvarez-Machain did not violate the terms of the
U.S.-Mexico extradition treaty.465 While the Court was correct in
holding that, under Ker v. Illinois,466 abduction should not deprive a
457. Id. at 2205-06 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
458. Id. at 2205 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
459. Id. (quoting Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 401 (1904) (Holmes,
J., dissenting)).
460. Id. (quoting United States v. Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 342 (1947) (Rutledge, J.,
dissenting)).
461. Id. at 2205-06 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens cited S. v. Ebrahim, S. AFR. L.
REP. (Apr.-June 1991), a case in which the South African Court of Appeal dismissed the prosecu-
tion of a defendant kidnapped from a foreign country by South African agents largely on the basis
of that court's understanding of U.S. Supreme Court precedent, including the Ker decision. Alva-
rez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2206 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
462. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2205-06 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
463. 112 S. Ct. 2188 (1992).
464. Id. at 2196-97.
465. Id. at 2197.
466. 119 U.S. 436 (1886); see also supra notes 206-61 (discussing Ker and its progeny).
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court of jurisdiction, it was wrong to assert that the United States
did not violate the treaty.
This decision did not address the issue of U.S. authority to con-
duct extraterritorial abductions, nor did it pass on the question of
the wisdom of such actions. To the extent that the decision encour-
ages a policy of international abduction of criminal suspects based
on no discernibly objective criteria, this decision is unwise. Further,
this decision - which ostensibly reflects a "victory" for law enforce-
ment - may instead frustrate the cooperative efforts of police agen-
cies by souring the diplomatic atmosphere in which these agencies
must work.
A. Violation of the Extradition Treaty and Its Impact on
Jurisdiction
1. The Treaty
Both the majority and the dissent viewed the question of whether
the U.S.-Mexico extradition treaty was violated as dispositive of the
question of whether U.S. courts had jurisdiction over Alvarez-
Machain. The majority held that, absent a treaty violation, jurisdic-
tion lay with the federal courts; 4 7 the dissent, in effect, agreed. 46 8
The critical substantive difference between the two positions was
that the majority concluded that the United States did not violate
the treaty,4 9 while the dissent concluded that it did.470
2. Jurisdiction Over the Defendant
Logically, the U.S. courts had jurisdiction to try Dr. Alvarez-
Machain regardless of whether the United States had breached the
extradition treaty. The Ker-Frisbie47 1 line of cases has consistently
held that violations of a suspect's constitutional rights during arrest
467. As framed by the Chief Justice:
[O]ur first inquiry must be whether the abduction of [Alvarez-Machain] from Mexico
violated the extradition treaty between the United States and Mexico. If we conclude
that the Treaty does not prohibit respondent's abduction, the rule in Ker applies, and
the court need not inquire as to how the respondent came before it.
Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2193.
468. Justice Stevens, in dissent, argued that "[i]t is clear that Mexico's demand [for Alvarez-
Machain's return] must be honored if this official abduction violated the 1978 Extradition Treaty
between the United States and Mexico." Id. at 2197 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
469. Id. at 2197.
470. Id. at 2197 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
471. See supra notes 206-21 and accompanying text (discussing the Ker-Frisbie line of cases).
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do not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the defendant's per-
son;472 treaties - and all other sources of law - are subordinate to
the Constitution. 73 It makes no sense to assert, as both the majority
and dissent seemed to do, that a treaty violation might deprive the
courts of jurisdiction while a constitutional violation will not.
The only exception to the Ker holding that constitutional viola-
tions do not deprive the courts of jurisdiction was first articulated by
the Second Circuit in United States v. Toscanino: 4 Where a de-
fendant can prove barbaric treatment at the hands of law enforce-
ment, the district court must divest itself of jurisdiction.4 75 Here, the
district court had explicitly found that the Toscanino exception did
not apply to the facts of this case.476
B. Violation of the Treaty
Given that the U.S.-Mexico Extradition Treaty does not contain a
specific clause limiting the respective parties to extradition under its
terms, it is obvious that there could be no violation of the express
terms of the treaty. While it is not, as the Court asserts, central to
the issue of jurisdiction, the majority's reading of the extradition
treaty is flawed in light of the purposes of the treaty itself and of the
extradition practices of states generally.477 To hold that an extradi-
tion treaty allows one state to violate the territorial integrity of an-
other state merely because it does not expressly forbid the practice
is simply absurd. 478 As the dissent points out, drawing this conclu-
472. See supra note 220 (citing cases which follow the holding in Ker).
473. U.S. CONST. art. V1, § 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which
shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land .... ").
474. 500 F.2d 267 (1974); see supra notes 239-61 and accompanying text (setting forth the
Toscanino exception and the courts' subsequent retreat from it).
475. Toscanino, 500 F.2d at 275-76.
476. United States v. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. 599, 605 (C.D. Cal. 1990).
477. See Extradition Treaty, May 4, 1978, U.S.-Mex., 31 U.S.T. 5061 pmbl. (noting that the
purpose of the treaty is to improve cooperation between the states with respect to criminal law);
see also supra notes 162-72 and accompanying text (discussing the rationale behind the practice
of international extradition).
478. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188, 2193 (1992). As Professor Lowenfeld
explains:
I must stay [sic), I found [that the proposition that the treaty allowed what it did not
expressly forbid] was the most remarkable statement in the majority's opinion. Imag-
ine a buyer and a seller make a contract for the sale of merchandise, and the seller
delivers stolen goods. When the buyer rejects the goods and demands his money back,
the seller says "But the contract did not contain a clause expressly stating that stolen
goods are not acceptable."
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sion required the Court to rewrite the terms of the treaty. 79
In holding that extradition is essentially a procedural device, in-
tended to impose mutual obligations only in "certain defined sets of
circumstances, 4 80 the Court mischaracterized the purposes of ex-
tradition. Extradition is more than the mere exchange of
criminals;4 81 its larger purposes are to promote stability through
peaceful and orderly cooperation among states482 and to coordinate
the fight against international crime.483 These are, in fact, the ex-
press purposes of the U.S.-Mexico extradition treaty at issue in this
case.
484
It is unlikely that asserting a right to break international law by
forcible abduction, an action that the majority conceded was in vio-
lation of international law, 485 will further the goal of international
cooperation in law enforcement. To assert that states have the uni-
lateral right to invade one another for the purpose of acquiring per-
sonal jurisdiction over criminal suspects calls into question the ra-
tionale for extradition in the first place.486 If one views extradition
treaties as merely procedural devices, conferring no substantive
rights on the state parties (or derivatively on individual fugitives),
then, as the dissent points out, such treaties are pointless. 87
On the other hand, a primary goal of extradition generally, and of
the U.S.-Mexico extradition treaty in particular, is the suppression
House Hearings, supra note 203, at 52 (statement of Prof. Lowenfeld).
479. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2199 n.l 1 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
480. Id. at 2194 (citation omitted).
481. See Wise, Civitas Maxima, supra note 163, at 109. Wise writes:
Extradition is not an end in itself. No one claims that it is somehow an intrinsic good
to maintain a certain balance of trade in fugitives from justice. Thus, if we are not to
regard extradition as an aimless activity, or a kind of sport, it must be found to serve
some ulterior purpose related to legitimate political ends.
Id.
482. See BASSIOUNI, PUBLIC ORDER, supra note 155, at 5 (noting that extradition remains, to a
large extent, "the most important instrument of cooperation between states").
483. See supra notes 162-72 and accompanying text (describing the rationale behind the prac-
tice of international extradition).
484. See Extradition Treaty, May 4, 1978, U.S.-Mex., 31 U.S.T. 5061 pmbl. (noting the mu-
tual desire of the United States and Mexico to cooperate closely in the fight against crime and to
assist in matters of extradition).
485. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188, 2196 (1992).
486. See House Hearings, supra note 203, at II (statement of Assoc. Prof. Steinhardt) (stating
that the Court's endorsement of government-sponsored abduction as an alternative to extradition
renders the treaty meaningless).
487. See Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2198 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that a construc-
tion of the document as nonexclusive renders the specific provisions of the treaty "little more than
verbiage").
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of serious international crime.488 To argue that states may never re-
sort to abduction of a criminal suspect is to create de facto safe
havens in those countries that refuse to view the duty to prosecute
or extradite as a civitas maxima.489 It is unrealistic to expect that
any state would adopt a rule of law that completely circumscribed
its freedom of action in the face of international crime emanating
from an "extradition haven."
C. Breaking International Law: The "Justifiable" Abduction
Despite the virtually universal view that abductions violate inter-
national law,"9" it seems intuitive that some abductions are nonethe-
less justifiable. Few would argue, for example, that Adolf Eich-
mann491 had some intrinsic "right" to live out his golden years in
Argentina, free from any retributive reckoning with the law. Eich-
mann clearly deserved "justice," in the broad sense of the term; ar-
guably, he deserved harsh justice.492 The question, in the context of
international public order, is under what circumstances might a
state be justified in violating the territorial integrity of another state
in pursuit of an individual fugitive.
To arrive at a conceptual framework for "justifiable" abductions
as a matter of policy, one must first assume that the existing extra-
dition regime has failed; it simply does not make sense to violate the
territorial integrity of another state when there are viable alterna-
tives. Second, one must assume that one objective of the state's con-
scious decision to disregard international law is prophylactic; that is,
the purpose of the policy is to put would-be offenders, in particular
states that refuse to cooperate in international extradition, on notice
that there will be no safe haven for a defined group of individual
offenders. Third, one must assume that the converse is also true:
states that do cooperate in the international arena must be assured
that their territorial sovereignty will not be violated. These assump-
488. See Extradition Treaty, May 4, 1978, U.S.-Mex., 31 U.S.T. 5061 pmbl. (noting the pur-
pose of the treaty); see also supra notes 162-72 and accompanying text (discussing the purposes of
extradition practice generally).
489. See supra notes 173-88 and accompanying text (discussing the duty of states to prosecute
or extradite).
490. See House Hearings, supra note 203 (asserting unanimously that unilateral abductions
violate customary international law as a violation of territorial integrity).
491. See supra notes 122-27 and accompanying text (discussing the Eichmann case).
492. This is not to suggest that Eichmann did not deserve due process; on the contrary, Eich-
mann deserved the full benefit of due process if for no other reason than to advance the demon-
strative element of the criminal law.
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tions imply two related assumptions: first, that the abducting state
recognizes its departure from international law; and second, that the
policy will be consistently applied.
Given these assumptions, a framework for nonconsensual interna-
tional abduction might consist of the following elements: a valid ju-
risdictional premise,"" a serious crime of an international character,
a failure on the part of the asylum state to prosecute or extradite
(taken in light of that state's historical tendencies in this respect), "9'
and the failure of alternate means of obtaining custody over the of-
fender. 95 Further, such a framework would have to take into ac-
count the basic human rights of the offender and strict adherence to
due process in his or her prosecution. Finally, as a matter of policy,
such a structure will fail unless there is compelling evidence of guilt
on the part of the individual fugitive.
1. Jurisdiction
As a threshold matter, any state desiring to prosecute a criminal
must have a valid jurisdictional premise.'96 Logically, the closer the
jurisdictional nexus between the fugitive and the prosecuting state,
the more justified a state is in asserting its power over an offender.
This suggests a hierarchy of the jurisdictional theories that reflects
the crime's connection to the forum state in descending order: terri-
torial, nationality, passive personality, protective, and universal. 97
In Alvarez-Machain, the United States clearly had valid jurisdic-
tional premises under which to prosecute the defendant. Complicity
in the abduction, torture, and murder of a U.S. law enforcement
agent in the performance of his duties confers jurisdiction based on
the objective territorial, 498 passive personality, 99 protective,50 0 and
493. See supra notes 26-35 and accompanying text (outlining the traditional bases of jurisdic-
tion under international law).
494. See supra notes 173-88 and accompanying text (discussing a state's duty to prosecute or
extradite).
495. See supra notes 197-205 and accompanying text (discussing informal means of rendition
between states).
496. See supra notes 26-35 and accompanying text (discussing international jurisdiction).
497. Bassiouni, Inter-State Cooperation, supra note 175, at 821. Professor Bassiouni also rec-
ommends developing rules for conflict resolution, including the establishment of an international
criminal court. Id.
498. A conspiracy to torture and murder a U.S. law enforcement agent abroad is certainly a
crime with objectively foreseeable consequences in the United States. See supra notes 36-57 and
accompanying text (discussing the objective territorial theory of jurisdiction).
499. Camarena-Salazar was a U.S. citizen. See supra notes 80-106 and accompanying text
(discussing the passive personality theory of jurisdiction).
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possibly universal theories. 501
2. Serious International Crimes
To justify a state's resort to abduction for an individual offender,
it is logical that the crime in question must be a serious crime of an
international character. A contrary conclusion might lead to prepos-
terous results; it seems unlikely that a state would abduct a criminal
from another state for a minor offense any more than it would at-
tempt to extradite a petty criminal.50 2 A "serious crime" of an inter-
national character, of course, raises definitional problems. As poten-
tial criterion, those crimes reflected in international instruments
provide a starting point. 50 3 The category might be further limited to
those crimes involving the loss of human life, but it is conceivable
that an international crime where no one dies might still trigger an
intense response in an offended state. Examples might include par-
ticularly egregious hostage-taking incidents, a torture incident in
which the victim survived, or sabotage of a particularly vital or sig-
nificant facility.
The United States charged Alvarez-Machain with complicity in
the abduction, torture, and murder of a U.S. law enforcement officer
in the performance of his duties. 504 That the torture and murder of
a law enforcement officer are serious crimes of international charac-
ter is self-evident. Camarena's murder was a despicable act of cal-
500. The murder of a law enforcement officer in the performance of his or her duties clearly
implicates protected interests of the United States. While the DEA agents in Mexico did not enjoy
diplomatic status, they were nevertheless there on official U.S. government business and with the
consent of the Mexican government. The United States has a legitimate and strong interest in
protecting its law enforcement officers both at home and abroad. See supra notes 67-79 and ac-
companying text (discussing the protective theory of jurisdiction); see also SHANNON, supra note
299, at 177-203 (describing the arrangements under which DEA agents worked in Mexico).
501. Torture may be a universal offense. As a definitional matter, the Torture Convention,
supra note 90, requires a state actor, a factor ostensibly not present in the actual torture of agent
Camarena. Arguably, however, where high-ranking state officials are allegedly complicit in the
crime, in aiding those directly responsible, and in obstructing the investigation, the inferential leap
to state responsibility is not large. Camarena-Salazar's captors beat and interrogated him to ob-
tain information on cooperative law enforcement operations undertaken by the United States and
Mexico. See supra notes 107-30 and accompanying text (discussing the universal theory of
jurisdiction).
502. See supra notes 149-61 and accompanying text (discussing extradition practice).
503. Professor Bassiouni has recommended the codification of international crimes, with the
proviso that these crimes be added to the domestic law of all countries. Bassiouni, Inter-State
Cooperation, supra note 175, at 821; see e.g., TORTURE CONVENTION, supra note 90; Hostage
Taking Convention, supra note 90 (both defining criminal behavior of international significance).
504. See supra note 357 (listing the charges against Alvarez-Machain).
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culated violence directed purposefully at an American law enforce-
ment officer.5"5 That he was murdered while engaging in a bilateral
law enforcement operation underscores the international character
of the crime.506 Clearly, Camarena's torture and murder rise to the
level of a "serious international crime."
3. The Duty to Prosecute or Extradite
The practice of international extradition rests on the premise that
states have a duty either to prosecute an offender or to extradite the
offender to a requesting state." 7 If a policy that allows abduction in
violation of international law has any validity at all, it can only have
it when the duty to prosecute or extradite has failed.50 8
The duty to prosecute or extradite in international law suffers
from an unfortunate lack of clear standards to apply.509 Questions
remain open as to what constitutes an effective prosecution and as to
when the duty to prosecute or extradite ought to attach. 10 Further,
in the context of abduction, a state's historical tendencies with re-
spect to extradition are relevant in determining whether extradition
requests will be futile, or whether the state will effectively prosecute
those offenders it does not extradite.
While the United States clearly had jurisdiction to try Dr. Alva-
rez-Machain, and a serious crime for which to try him, it is much
more difficult to conclude that the Mexican government failed in its
duty either to prosecute or extradite Dr. Alvarez-Machain. Clearly,
where a state refuses to extradite its nationals, or as here, where a
state is forbidden by its domestic laws from doing so,51' the extradi-
tion request seems superfluous. Obviously, the Mexican government
was not going to extradite Alvarez-Machain - indeed it could not
505. See supra notes 299-304 and accompanying text (describing the treatment Camarena
suffered).
506. See SHANNON, supra note 299, at 226 (describing the cooperative arrangements between
the Mexican government and the DEA).
507. See supra notes 173-88 and accompanying text (discussing the duty to prosecute or
extradite).
508. See Bassiouni, Inter-State Cooperation, supra note 175, at 821 (arguing for the adoption
of international minimum standards for application to the duty to prosecute or extradite).
509. Id. at 814.
510. See generally id. (noting the lack of international standards as to what constitutes a good
faith prosecution).
511. See supra note 198 (noting the Mexican constitutional proscription on extraditing
nationals).
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do so legally under Mexican law.512 Logically, it seems senseless to
require an extradition request that both parties know will not result
in an extradition. The duty to prosecute, therefore, ought to attach
at the point at which the indictment is handed down in the request-
ing nation's courts and the asylum country is made aware of it. Ac-
cepting this logic, Mexico may have arguably failed in its duty to
extradite or prosecute Dr. Alvarez-Machain.
Taken in the context of Mexico's historical willingness to cooper-
ate in international law enforcement, however, this argument falls
flat. While Mexico's record in extraditing criminals to the United
States is not perfect,513 it acted swiftly to obtain custody over Caro-
Quintero, 511 and had at least initially cooperated in bringing
Verdugo-Urquidez before the U.S. criminal justice system.5"5 Be-
yond that, Mexico was (and is) actively cooperating with the United
States in the fight against international drug trafficking. While the
success of that effort has been mixed (the Mexican government
clearly has internal problems with corruption and inefficiency),5"6 it
does not seem constructive to antagonize a nation that is basically
committed to the same international law enforcement goals as the
United States for the purpose of apprehending an individual suspect.
4. Failure of Other Methods
A fundamental presumption about a "justifiable" abduction is
that it is a remedy of last resort. Thus, its validity rests on a show-
ing that all other methods have failed or would be futile. If a duty is
levied on the asylum state to prosecute or extradite, it is only ra-
tional that they be given that opportunity.
There is no evidence that the United States exhausted all availa-
ble diplomatic and legal methods for acquiring Alvarez-Machain's
512. See supra note 198 (noting Mexico's laws on extradition of its nationals).
513. See House Hearings, supra note 203, at 9 (statement of Judge Sofaer) (describing an
incident in which the Mexican government allowed a fugitive wanted in the United States for
terrorist activities to escape to Cuba).
514. Caro-Quintero is currently serving a forty-year sentence in a Mexican prison for his role
in the Camarena killing. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188, 2197 n.2 (1992)
(Stevens, J., dissenting); see supra notes 308-17 and accompanying text (describing Caro-Quin-
tero's apprehension and the role of the Mexican police).
515. See supra notes 318-39 and accompanying text (describing Verdugo-Urquidez's
apprehension).
516. See generally, SHANNON, supra note 299 (providing a vivid account of Mexico's problems
of corruption and official misconduct).
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presence. 17 No source suggests that the United States sought Dr.
Alvarez-Machain's prosecution through any legal or diplomatic
channel. Apart from the abortive negotiations between the DEA and
the MFJP, there is no public record to show that the United States
discussed the issue with Mexican authorities. Rather, it seems that
once informal negotiations fell apart,518 the next step for the United
States was the abduction.
5. Protecting Human Rights and Due Process
Some force, whether threatened or actual, is generally necessary
to bring any criminal suspect into custody. Excessive force, however,
serves no valid law enforcement purpose and violates internationally
accepted norms of state behavior.519 Given the international atten-
tion an abduction is likely to command, such an action heightens the
importance of scrupulously fair treatment.520 As a starting point,
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides
the minimal due process rights which should apply to a criminal
suspect abducted from a foreign country. Specifically, the accused
should have the right to be informed of the charges against him or
her 52' and the right to be brought before a judicial officer without
delay. 22 In addition, the credibility of an abduction depends on pro-
tecting the suspect from torture. 23
There is no evidence to suggest that Dr. Alvarez-Machain's treat-
ment within the U.S. criminal justice system violated any of the ex-
press provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights. As explicitly noted by the district court, there was no credi-
ble evidence that U.S. agents used excessive force or brutality in
bringing Dr. Alvarez-Machain into custody. 24 Certainly Dr. Alva-
rez-Machain did not suffer degradation to a degree sufficient enough
517. No source indicates direct communications between responsible U.S. and Mexican agents
concerning Dr. Alvarez-Machain.
518. See United States v. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. 599, 602-03 (C.D. Cal. 1990) (describ-
ing the growing tension between the Mexican and U.S. governments over the Camarena incident
and the resulting breakdown in informal negotiations).
519. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 170, at arts. 9-10,
14-16 (outlining the basic due process requirements of any criminal prosecution).
520. See supra note II (noting the international reaction to Alvarez-Machain).
521. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 170, at art. 9.
522. Id.
523. Id. art. 7.
524. United States v. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. 599, 603-04 (C.D. Cal. 1990).
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to trigger the Toscanino "exception." '525
6. Compelling Evidence
As a practical matter, it is senseless for a state to violate another
state's territorial integrity in pursuit of an individual suspect with-
out compelling evidence of that person's guilt. The diplomatic ran-
cor that abductions produce demands a strong showing that the sus-
pect is indeed the perpetrator.52 That the evidence presented to the
district court on remand failed to withstand a motion to dismiss
highlights the fact that the United States did not have compelling
evidence of Dr. Alvarez-Machain's guilt.527 Thus, under the pro-
posed policy analysis, the United States was not justified in violating
the territorial sovereignty of Mexico in pursuit of Dr. Alvarez-
Machain. While the United States had a valid jurisdictional nexus
with both the offender and the crime, and while the crime involved
was of international significance, the record failed to establish that
the Mexican government failed in its duty to prosecute or extradite
Dr. Alvarez-Machain. Further, the United States failed to exhaust
all other diplomatic and legal means of securing Dr. Alvarez-
Machain's presence.
D. Advancing the Ends of Law Enforcement
With "startling nonchalance, 52 8 the Court conceded that its deci-
sion might violate international law; it then responded, in effect,
with a demurrer.529 In fact, the violation of the territorial integrity
of one state by another is virtually always a violation of interna-
tional law. It is difficult to see how a precedent that is itself violative
of internationally recognized legal norms represents an advancement
of the rule of law. It is, in effect, a "stunning endorsement of law-
lessness."5 '' Ironically, the Alvarez-Machain decision, while superfi-
cially a victory for law enforcement, actually does little to advance
525. See supra notes 239-61 and accompanying text (describing the Toscanino exception to the
Ker-Frisbie doctrine).
526. In the Eichmann case; for example, there was ample documentary evidence, as well as
eyewitnesses, to support the charges of murder levied against the defendant. See Randall, supra
note 44, at 810-15 (discussing the Eichmann case).
527. See de Lama, supra note 14 (reporting that the case was dismissed for lack of sufficient
evidence).
528. See Moynihan, supra note II.
529. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188, 2196 (1992).
530. House Hearings, supra note 203, at 13 (statement of Assoc. Prof. Steinhardt).
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the cause of effective law enforcement. Rather, international law en-
forcement became immediately more difficult and strained as a re-
sult of the Alvarez-Machain decision. By creating a diplomatic fu-
ror,531  the Alvarez-Machain abduction temporarily halted DEA
activities in Mexico, and resulted in a long term reevaluation of the
relationship between the DEA and the MFJP.532 Similarly, other
nations quickly demanded reassurances that U.S. law enforcement
activities in their countries would not exceed the bounds of interna-
tional law.533 The United States, to a greater or lesser extent, must
rely on cooperation with other countries for enforcement of its do-
mestic laws.5"4 A precedent that sours the climate of mutual trust
between nations respecting control of international law enforcement
is likely to thwart efforts to streamline procedures and to codify
methodologies for bringing international criminals to justice.535
In concluding that extradition treaties do not represent the exclu-
sive means by which states may exchange fugitives, 36 the Court
was, essentially, only half correct. While extradition is the only for-
mal method for exchanging fugitives under international law, other,
less invasive techniques, such as informal rendition, are available to
states for bringing criminal suspects to trial.537 These techniques,
while skirting the fringes of international legality, have the distinct
advantage of protecting the respective states' territorial integrity.538
Consequently, they rarely result in the, kind of diplomatic fallout
that is bound to further frustrate law enforcement efforts.539 Abduc-
tions, on the other hand, are violations of both domestic540 and inter-
531. See generally supra note 11 (describing the resulting diplomatic fallout, particularly in
Central and South America).
532. Foreign Minister Says Machain Ruling "'Insulted" Mexican Sovereignty, supra note 11.
533. See supra note II (citing responses from both the legal and international studies
communities).
534. Bassiouni, INTER-STATE COOPERATION, supra note 175, at 812-13.
535. See id. (arguing for increased international cooperation in strengthening law enforcement
modalities and greater, codified control over currently informal police practices).
536. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188, 2194 (1992).
537. See supra notes 189-205 and accompanying text (discussing irregular rendition).
538. See House Hearings, supra note 203, at 6 (statement of Judge Sofaer) (commenting on
the violation of a state's territorial integrity as a breach of international law).
539. By contrast, the Alvarez-Machain abduction resulted in a brief curtailment of all DEA
activities in Mexico and a subsequent reassessment of the relationship between Mexican and U.S.
law enforcement officers. See Foreign Minister Says Machain Ruling "Insulted" Mexicah Sover-
eignty, supra note 11.
540. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d 1214, 1216 n.1 (9th Cir. 1989) (noting
that Mexican authorities charged the DEA agents involved in Verdugo-Urquidez's irregular rendi-
tion with kidnapping under Mexican law).
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national law, 541 and as such tend to promote distrust in the interna-
tional community.
This line of argument begs the question of why the DEA did not
simply pay the $50,000 the MFJP wanted in the first place.542 A
rough calculation indicates that, by paying $20,000 as a reward,
plus $6,000 per week in expenses, the DEA actually spent more
than twice the originally requested amount (roughly $108,000) by
the time Dr. Alvarez-Machain's hearing in the district court took
place.543
IV. IMPACT
The impact of United States v. Alvarez-Machain is difficult to
assess, particularly in view of the United States's subsequent failure
to obtain a conviction in the case. Had it gone otherwise, and had
Alvarez-Machain been convicted of complicity in the murder of
Camarena-Salazar, one might expect the DEA and other law en-
forcement agencies to be emboldened by success. As it stands, one
might expect that they are chastened by failure. Given this embar-
rassment, it is not likely that this decision will spark a rash of ab-
ductions by U.S. law enforcement agents.
While the Court did not explicitly assert a unilateral right to ab-
duct foreign criminal suspects, 54 4 that is certainly the popular per-
ception of the decision. 45 If the U.S. has the "right" to kidnap sus-
pects from foreign soil to stand trial in the United States, then other
states logically have a reciprocal right to abduct American citizens
from American soil to stand trial abroad. 4 While this scenario de-
pends on the relative abilities of those states to project power inter-
nationally, the impact on American citizens living abroad may be
541. See, e.g., House Hearings, supra note 203, at 20 (statement of Assoc. Prof. Steinhardt)
(discussing international abductions as violations of international law).
542. See United States v. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. 599, 602 (C.D. Cal. 1990) (describing
the aborted negotiations between the MFJP and the DEA).
543. See id. at 603 (describing the financial arrangements between the DEA and the
kidnappers).
544. See United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188, 2193 (1992) (conceding that
international abductions may violate international law).
545. See, e.g., Reaction to U.S. Supreme Court Decision Endorsing Right to Kidnap Foreign-
ersfor Prosecution in U.S., supra note II (noting the reactions of Latin American leaders to the
Court's endorsement of a right to kidnap); U.S. Right to Abduct Rejected by Angry CARICOM
Leaders, supra note 11 (noting the reaction of Caribbean leaders and criticizing the Supreme
Court's endorsement of a right to kidnap).
546. See Abramovsky, Abductions, supra note 198, at 151 (posing a hypothetical abduction of
a U.S. citizen in the United States by Iraqi agents).
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more immediate. If a foreign sovereign obtains custody of a U.S.
national, it will have a ready propaganda tool in United States v.
Alvarez-Machain.
It is likely that at least some of the 103 nations that have extradi-
tion treaties with the United States will attempt to renegotiate the
terms of these instruments to include an explicit prohibition on ab-
ductions.547 Even assuming these nations do not renegotiate the
terms of their mutual extradition treaties with the United States,
they will almost certainly require reassurances from the United
States with respect to their expectations of territorial sovereignty. 48
Finally, while the impact of Alvarez-Machain may only be
surmised, the decision has sparked a high level of discussion on the
subject of extraterritorial abduction. 49 Legislative attempts to cur-
tail U.S. actions abroad are certain to engender controversy and de-
bate on the topic.55 While this author disagrees with the notion of
circumscribing U.S. freedom of action entirely, the discussion that
such legislation is bound to generate may cause a fundamental re-
thinking of U.S. policy on extraterritorial abductions and a move
toward a model based on principles of international jurisdiction and
international cooperation in penal matters.
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's opinion in United States v. Alvarez-
Machain is consistent with its precedent in Ker, irrespective of
whether the abduction violated the terms of the U.S.-Mexico extra-
dition treaty. This opinion concededly violates customary interna-
tional law, and does little to advance the purposes of international
extradition practice. While the United States had valid subject mat-
ter jurisdiction over the crimes alleged in Dr. Alvarez-Machain's in-
dictment, and while the Mexican government arguably failed in its
duty to prosecute or extradite the defendant, these facts hardly jus-
tify the "self-help" remedy sanctioned by the Supreme Court.
Rather, what is needed is a realistic policy approach that recognizes
a specific and limited exception to the rule of customary interna-
547. House Hearings, supra note 203, at 39-41 (statement of Assoc. Prof. Steinhardt).
548. See Washington Reassures Columbia Over Kidnappings, supra note 11 (noting diplomatic
efforts to reassure Columbia that the U.S. respects Columbia's territorial integrity).
549. See supra note 11 (citing responses from both the legal and international communities).
550. International Kidnapping and Extradition Treaty Enforcement Act of 1992, H.R. 5565,
102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992).
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tional law. This exception should be employed only in the most exi-
gent of circumstances and even then must be applied consistently.
While the United States need not completely circumscribe its ability
to deal with dynamic international law enforcement problems,5 1 the
powerful weapon of international abduction is not, as a matter of
policy, the most effective course for achieving those aims.
Alvarez-Machain reestablishes the court's jurisdiction over a
criminal defendant present before the court, despite the method
used to secure that presence. It does not establish the wisdom of
abduction as a policy. As the Alvarez-Machain case points up, the
current policy has, indeed, backfired on its drafters:552 the United
States went to the trouble and expense of litigating Alvarez-
Machain all the way to the United States Supreme Court, subject-
ing itself to intense international criticism,553 for a case that could
not withstand a motion to dismiss for lack of evidence.554
Edmund S. McAlister
551. See Sofaer, supra note 192, at 112-13 (delineating several rationales which would justify
international abduction in the context of terrorism, and arguing that the United States maintains
its right to conduct international abductions as a prophylactic measure to undermine terrorists'
beliefs in a safe haven).
552. See Abramovsky, Abductions, supra note 198, at 152 (noting that the U.S. policy of ex-
traterritorial abduction is "likely to backfire on its drafters").
553. See supra note 11 (detailing criticisms of the U.S. handling of the Alvarez-Machain
matter).
554. See de Lama, supra note 14 (discussing the dismissal of the charges against Dr. Alvarez-
Machain).
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